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SECRET FAITS ACCOMPLIS:  DECLINATION 
DECISIONS, NONPROSECUTION AGREEMENTS, 
AND THE CRIME VICTIM’S RIGHT TO CONFER 
Zulkifl M. Zargar* 
 
The state’s monopoly power over the institution of prosecution is a feature 
as familiar as any in the American criminal justice system.  That the criminal 
proceeding is between the state and the defendant leaves little doubt as to the 
identities of the victimized interest and the offender.  But, in avenging societal 
harm alone, the criminal process treats another victim—the crime victim—
as an outcast. 
Beginning in the 1970s, the victim’s rights movement mobilized to address 
this institutional neglect, and, by most accounts, it has triumphed.  Federal 
and state victim’s rights laws now empower victims to attend criminal 
proceedings, deliver impact statements at sentencings, and collect restitution 
awards.  Perhaps no statutory right is as emblematic of the victim’s acquired 
prominence in the criminal process than the right to confer with the 
prosecutor, codified in the federal Crime Victims’ Rights Act of 2004 and in 
most states’ laws. 
Conferral seems an intuitive mechanism to facilitate information transfer 
regarding developments in a case.  What remains unclear, however, is 
whether the law contemplates the existence of a conferral right when there 
is no case.  What, if any, are prosecutors’ obligations to confer with crime 
victims if they ultimately decline to bring charges? 
This Note illustrates that victim exclusion, especially at the outset, 
portends adverse consequences for both victims and the proper functioning 
of the criminal process.  In most jurisdictions, prosecutors are under no legal 
obligation to confer with victims about their declination decisions, owing 
primarily to a judicial reluctance to circumscribe and a statutory intent to 
preserve prosecutorial discretion.  This Note proposes that prosecutors’ 
offices promulgate internal guidelines to encourage—and, in some cases 
require—victim conferral prior to a declination decision.  The guidelines 
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unwavering support during an uncertain time.  Finally, I thank my parents, Dr. Javaid A. 
Zargar and Ambreen Zargar, for everything. 
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would not aim to disturb such a decision nor would they create untenable 
administrative burdens for criminal justice actors or frustrate their 
discretion.  Rather, they are animated by principles of procedural justice that 
emphasize process over outcome and thus seek to encourage meaningful 
conferral where victims are kept informed and their opinions solicited. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The criminal justice system has long functioned on the assumption that 
crime victims should behave like good Victorian children—seen but not 
heard. 
—Judge Alex Kozinski1 
 
Why didn’t anyone consult me?  I was the one who was kidnapped, not the 
State of Virginia. 
—Unnamed Crime Victim2 
 
During an eight-year stretch between 1999 and 2007, Jeffrey Epstein and 
several coconspirators sexually abused over thirty minor girls, some as young 
as fourteen.3  Following a tip—and a two-year joint investigation with the 
Palm Beach Police Department—the FBI referred the matter to the U.S. 
Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Florida.4  As early as January 
2007, Epstein’s defense counsel began negotiating with the U.S. Attorney’s 
Office to avoid indictment.5  The U.S. Attorney’s Office simultaneously 
corresponded with Epstein’s victims and, pursuant to the Crime Victims’ 
Rights Act6 (CVRA), sent letters notifying them of their statutory rights, 
including the “[t]he reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the 
[Government] in the case.”7 
 
 1. Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 435 F.3d 1011, 1013 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 2. LOIS HAIGHT HERRINGTON ET AL., FINAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 
VICTIMS OF CRIME 9 (1982), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ovc/87299.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
4YCB-X5FN] (quoting unnamed crime victim). 
 3. In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196, 1198 (11th Cir.), vacated, reh’g en banc granted, No. 19-
13843, 2020 WL 4557083 (11th Cir. Aug. 7, 2020) (mem.). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at 1198–99. 
 6. 18 U.S.C. § 3771.  Congress later amended the CVRA and added two more statutory 
rights. See Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-22, 129 Stat. 227 
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(9)–(10)); see also infra Parts II.A.1, II.B.1. 
 7. In re Wild, 955 F.3d at 1199 (alterations in original); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(1)–
(8).  At the time, the CVRA afforded victims the following eight enumerated rights: 
  (1) The right to be reasonably protected from the accused. 
  (2) The right to reasonable, accurate, and timely notice of any public court 
proceeding, or any parole proceeding, involving the crime or of any release or 
escape of the accused. 
  (3) The right not to be excluded from any such public court proceeding, unless 
the court, after receiving clear and convincing evidence, determines that testimony 
by the victim would be materially altered if the victim heard other testimony at that 
proceeding. 
  (4) The right to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the district court 
involving release, plea, sentencing, or any parole proceeding. 
  (5) The reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the Government in the 
case. 
  (6) The right to full and timely restitution as provided in law. 
  (7) The right to proceedings free from unreasonable delay. 
  (8) The right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim’s dignity 
and privacy. 
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By May 2007, the U.S. Attorney’s Office had drafted a fifty-three-page 
indictment charging Epstein with several federal offenses.8  But just four 
months later, the government instead executed an “infamous” 
nonprosecution agreement (NPA) with Epstein in exchange for his pleading 
guilty to two state prostitution offenses.9  In June 2008, Epstein pled guilty 
to his state crimes.10 
At no point between the start of the investigation and the signing of the 
NPA did federal prosecutors “confer” with victims about the NPA, let alone 
tell them that it was under consideration.11  What is more, the government 
continued to send victims boilerplate letters stating that their case was 
“currently under investigation” as late as eight months after signing the 
NPA.12  It was not until after Courtney Wild, one of thirty-four identified 
victims, brought suit seeking enforcement of her CVRA rights in July 2008 
that the government disclosed the NPA’s existence.13 
Wild alleged that, by keeping her in the dark about negotiations with 
Epstein and the NPA, prosecutors violated her right to confer under the 
CVRA.14  The government countered that CVRA rights attach only upon 
filing charges and, given the absence of any federal charges, Wild had no 
CVRA rights for prosecutors to violate.15  Over the next decade, the District 
Court for the Southern District of Florida issued several important rulings:  
(1) that the CVRA attaches before the government brings formal charges;16 
(2) that by secretly negotiating and entering into an NPA with Epstein, the 
government infringed Wild’s right to confer;17 and (3) that Epstein’s death 
by apparent suicide, among other facts, mooted many of the remedies sought, 
including recission of the NPA.18 
As directed by the CVRA, Wild petitioned the Eleventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals for a writ of mandamus to pursue her remedies.19  Earlier this year, 
the Eleventh Circuit issued its opinion, calling the facts “beyond scandalous” 
 
Pub. L. No. 108-405, 118 Stat. 2260, 2261 (2004). 
 8. In re Wild, 955 F.3d at 1199. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. (citing Doe 1 v. United States, 359 F. Supp. 3d 1201, 1208 (S.D. Fla. 2019)). 
 12. Id. at 1200. 
 13. Id.  A second, still unnamed petitioner later joined the suit, but for clarity’s sake, this 
Note will refer to Wild or to the petitioner in the singular. Id. at 1200 n.4. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Government’s Response to Victim’s Emergency Petition for Enforcement of Crime 
Victim Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3771, at 3, Doe 1 v. United States, 359 F. Supp. 3d 1201 (S.D. 
Fla. 2019) (No. 08 Civ. 80736), ECF No. 15.  Interestingly, prior to changing its stance once 
the litigation began, the government initially took the position—in the letters it had sent to 
victims—that the victims did possess CVRA rights, such as the right to confer. See In re Wild, 
955 F.3d at 1227 (Hull, J., dissenting). 
 16. Does v. United States (Doe I), 817 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1341 (S.D. Fla. 2011); see also 
Doe v. United States (Doe II), 950 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1267 (S.D. Fla. 2013) (extending the 
application of the right to confer in particular to precharge stages).  
 17. Doe 1 v. United States (Doe III), 359 F. Supp. 3d 1201, 1219–20 (S.D. Fla. 2019). 
 18. Doe 1 v. United States (Doe IV), 411 F. Supp. 3d 1321, 1321–31 (S.D. Fla. 2019). 
 19. In re Wild, 955 F.3d at 1202. 
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and a “national disgrace” but denied Wild’s petition.20  Overruling the lower 
court, the majority invoked canons of statutory interpretation and principles 
of prosecutorial discretion to hold that CVRA rights attach only when 
charges are filed against the defendant.21  The majority acknowledged that 
its ruling “will not prevent federal prosecutors from negotiating ‘secret’ plea 
and non-prosecution agreements, without ever notifying or conferring with 
victims.”22  “It’s not a result we like,” the majority wrote, “but it’s the result 
we think the law requires.”23 
In so many ways, the Epstein case is a remarkable one.24  What this Note 
ultimately proposes—internal guidelines to encourage or require prosecutors 
to confer with victims—will admittedly do little if federal prosecutors are 
inclined to work “hand-in-hand” with defense counsel to actively 
misrepresent and keep information from victims.25  But despite its extreme 
nature, the case makes evident that where there are no charges, prosecutors 
by and large have no legal obligation to confer,26 nor do any Department of 
Justice (DOJ) policies encourage them to confer.27  The same is true in the 
states, most of which also extend to victims a conferral right.28 
This Note intends to fill these gaps.29  It recommends the use of guidelines 
because it ultimately accepts as a premise the general state of the law—that 
 
 20. Id. at 1198. 
 21. Id. at 1205.  In a procedural battle, Wild contested whether the predicate issue of the 
CVRA’s precharge applicability was appropriately before the court, arguing that the 
government, by addressing the issue in its response to Wild’s petition instead of cross-
appealing that portion of the lower court’s ruling, waived any such arguments. Id. at 1205 n.6.  
The Eleventh Circuit rejected Wild’s argument and held that a petition for a writ of mandamus 
is not an ordinary appeal but an original application and that the government was free to raise 
any argument it wished in its response. Id. 
 22. Id. at 1221. 
 23. Id. at 1198.  Wild successfully petitioned for en banc review, and an oral argument is 
scheduled for December 3, 2020. Petition for Rehearing En Banc, In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196 
(No. 19-13843); see also Order Granting Motion to Expedite En Banc Consideration, In re 
Wild, 955 F.3d 1196 (No. 19-13843), ECF No. 46.  The CVRA’s original cosponsors 
submitted an amicus brief in support of en banc review. Brief of Senator Dianne Feinstein and 
Former Senators Jon Kyl and Orrin Hatch as Amici Curiae in Support of Rehearing En Banc, 
In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196 (No. 19-13843). 
 24. Even setting aside the Eleventh Circuit’s characterization of the case, the NPA at issue 
also was “highly unusual” in that it immunized Epstein’s coconspirators from future 
prosecution, none of whom had helped or cooperated with the government. Elkan Abramowitz 
& Jonathan Sack, Limiting Victims’ Rights:  Eleventh Circuit Reads CVRA Narrowly, N.Y.L.J. 
(May 27, 2020, 12:30 PM), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2020/05/27/limiting-
victims-rights-eleventh-circuit-reads-cvra-narrowly/ [https://perma.cc/Y2AA-LPK6]. 
 25. In re Wild, 955 F.3d at 1199. 
 26. See id. at 1205, 1221; see also infra Part II.A. 
 27. See infra Part II.A.1. 
 28. See infra Parts II.A.3, II.B.3. 
 29. This Note addresses the closed universe where victims wish to exercise their conferral 
rights and participate in the conventional criminal justice process.  “There may well be persons 
and entities entitled to notification and participation who neither expect nor particularly want 
to be involved in the criminal justice process, the traditional focus of which has traditionally 
been to resolve disputes between the government and an accused offender.” United States v. 
Turner, 367 F. Supp. 2d 319, 329 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).  Consequently, this Note does not consider 
alternative mechanisms for seeking justice, such as restorative justice or parallel justice, nor 
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legislatures have not granted and courts do not recognize a judicially 
enforceable precharge victim’s right to confer.30  Part I discusses the contours 
of and barriers to victim participation in the criminal process broadly and 
presents procedural justice theory as a mechanism to facilitate meaningful 
victim participation.  Procedural justice emphasizes including and giving a 
voice to stakeholders in a particular process even—and especially—where 
they have limited or no control over the outcome.31  Part II looks to federal 
and state laws, including pending legislation, that establish a right to confer 
in order to determine whether the right attaches precharge (and thus in the 
absence of charges) and what conferral entails.  Last, Part III argues 
reasonable conferral should occur in cases where the prosecutor intends to 
exercise their nonprosecution discretion.32  Part III proposes language 
encouraging or—if signing an NPA33—directing the prosecutor to confer 
with the victim in such cases, subject to limitations such as the need for 
confidentiality and certain administrative costs.34  Separately, this Note 
 
does it advocate for victims to choose a particular course.  For an extended discussion of the 
merits of restorative justice in furthering victim’s rights, see generally DANIELLE SERED, UNTIL 
WE RECKON (2019); Lara Abigail Bazelon & Bruce A. Green, Victims’ Rights from a 
Restorative Perspective, 17 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 293 (2020).  For a discussion of the utility of 
parallel justice in furthering victim’s rights, see generally SUSAN HERMAN, PARALLEL JUSTICE 
FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME (2010). 
 30. See infra Part III.  When referring to victim’s rights or to the eponymous social 
movement, this Note uses the singular form, “victim’s rights,” instead of the plural “victims’ 
rights.”  While the CVRA and most scholars use the latter, this Note uses the former because 
these rights are not collective but individual rights. See Lynne Henderson, Revisiting Victim’s 
Rights, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 383, 383 n.1. 
 31. See infra Part I.B.2. 
 32. This Note uses the phrase “nonprosecution discretion” when referring to prosecutorial 
discretion to decline to bring charges, since it more appropriately describes “the discretionary 
and plenary power not to prosecute.” See Alexander A. Zendeh, Note, Can Congress Authorize 
Judicial Review of Deferred Prosecution and Nonprosecution Agreements?:  And Does It 
Need To?, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1451, 1453 n.16 (2017) (quoting PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES 
OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 925 (6th ed. 2014)); see also infra note 84 and 
accompanying text.  Bringing prosecutions is a different matter—while a federal prosecution 
is ordinarily initiated by the executive branch, some states do allow private prosecution on 
behalf of the state. See, e.g., Darryl K. Brown, Criminal Enforcement Redundancy:  Oversight 
of Decisions Not to Prosecute, 103 MINN. L. REV. 843, 867–73 (2018) (recounting the near 
abolishment of private prosecution in the states).  Such actions are beyond the scope of this 
Note, which deals with the standard public prosecution scheme. 
 33. This Note takes no position on the propriety of exercising nonprosecution discretion 
or entering into an NPA.  For select critiques on the use of NPAs in particular, see infra note 
253 and accompanying text. 
 34. As a preface, there is a robust body of literature criticizing the trend of increasing 
victim involvement in the criminal justice process.  Many such concerns deal with the 
undesirable consequences—including for victims—of increased victim participation in 
criminal prosecution, at its core an adversarial process concerned only with the interests of the 
parties to the litigation. See generally Donald J. Hall, Victims’ Voices in Criminal Court:  The 
Need for Restraint, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 233 (1991); Lynne N. Henderson, The Wrongs of 
Victim’s Rights, 37 STAN. L. REV. 937 (1985); Erin C. Blondel, Note, Victims’ Rights in an 
Adversary System, 58 DUKE L.J. 237 (2008); Danielle Levine, Comment, Public Wrongs and 
Private Rights:  Limiting the Victim’s Role in a System of Public Prosecution, 104 NW. U. L. 
REV. 335 (2010).  Because this Note ultimately addresses victim’s rights in a nonprosecution 
posture, it does not fully evaluate the merits of such critiques.  However, to the extent that 
some criticisms relate to nonprosecution alone, they are addressed in Part III.  In any event, 
2020] SECRET FAITS ACCOMPLIS 349 
recognizes that potential defendants may oppose a policy that encourages or 
requires prosecutors to confer with victims in a nonprosecution posture for 
fear that they may well become actual defendants, and Part III also addresses 
this concern. 
I.  VICTIM PARTICIPATION IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS 
The crime victim was once a central player in the American criminal 
prosecution—as a private citizen, she hired investigators and prosecuted 
perpetrators at her own expense.35  For a variety of reasons, however, 
including the idea that crime primarily damages society—not the 
individual—and the embracing of a punishment apparatus to redress societal 
harm, the crime victim was eventually relegated to an outsider status.36  No 
longer the primary decision maker nor a direct recipient of benefits, the crime 
victim came to occupy only the roles of complainant and witness for the 
prosecution.37  In 1971, Lewis Powell declared that “the victims of crime 
have become the forgotten men of our society.”38  With the adoption of 
Federal Rule of Evidence 615 several years later, which granted either party 
the right to exclude from trial any witnesses,39 including victims, the crime 
victim’s exclusion was fully achieved.40 
Part I.A briefly describes the rise of the victim’s rights movement against 
this history of exclusion and the corresponding reinsertion of the victim into 
the criminal justice process.  Part I.B then narrows the focus to the utility of 
victim involvement in the early stages of a criminal case and presents 
procedural justice as a means for facilitating such involvement. 
 
this Note operates under the premise that victim participation has become and will continue 
to be a fixture in our criminal justice system. See Erin Ann O’Hara, Victim Participation in 
the Criminal Process, 13 J.L. & POL’Y 229, 233 (2005). 
 35. See Shirley S. Abrahamson, Redefining Roles:  The Victims’ Rights Movement, 1985 
UTAH L. REV. 517, 521. 
 36. See, e.g., William F. McDonald, Towards a Bicentennial Revolution in Criminal 
Justice:  The Return of the Victim, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 649, 654–68 (1976) (providing a 
detailed examination of the victim’s declining role with the emergence of public prosecution 
in the United States); see also HERRINGTON ET AL., supra note 2, at vi (“Somewhere along the 
way, the system began to serve lawyers and judges and defendants, treating the victim with 
institutionalized disinterest.”). 
 37. See Abraham S. Goldstein, Defining the Role of the Victim in Criminal Prosecution, 
52 MISS. L.J. 515, 519–20 (1982); Andrew J. Karmen, Who’s Against Victims’ Rights?:  The 
Nature of the Opposition to Pro-victim Initiatives in Criminal Justice, 8 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL 
COMMENT. 157, 158 (1992); see also McDonald, supra note 36, at 673. 
 38. Jill Lepore, The Rise of the Victims’-Rights Movement, NEW YORKER (May 14, 2018), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/05/21/the-rise-of-the-victims-rights-movement 
[https://perma.cc/9N6Z-ESEM]. 
 39. FED. R. EVID. 615 notes of advisory committee on proposed rules (omitting victims 
from the list of exceptions). 
 40. DOUGLAS E. BELOOF, VICTIMS’ RIGHTS:  DOCUMENTARY AND REFERENCE GUIDE 19 
(2012). 
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A.  A Brief History of the Victim’s Increasing Role in the Criminal Justice 
Process 
The victim’s rights movement began as an “unlikely marriage of 
conservatism and feminism.”41  The conservative-led “tough-on-crime” 
campaign found valuable fuel in a series of defendant-friendly rulings by the 
Warren Court, which, in just a five-year span in the 1960s, recognized the 
exclusionary rule, Miranda rights, and the right to counsel for indigent 
criminal defendants.42  National crime rates, which rose steadily in the 1960s, 
continued to increase and reached a peak in 1981.43  Meanwhile, women’s 
groups led a successful public awareness campaign focused on rape and 
domestic violence and established community-based rape crisis centers and 
domestic violence shelters.44  In 1975, Susan Brownmiller published Against 
Our Will:  Men, Women, and Rape, a particularly influential book that sought 
to redefine rape as a crime of “physical assault,” not just one against “sexual 
morality,” and brought public attention to the institutional insensitivity 
exhibited toward sexual assault victims.45 
A seminal moment arrived in 1982, when President Ronald Reagan 
convened the President’s Task Force on Victims of Crime.46  Partly clothed 
in law-and-order rhetoric, the task force’s report opened by proclaiming, 
“Something insidious has happened in America:  crime has made victims of 
us all.”47  The report recommended that legislatures, police, prosecutors, and 
the judiciary each acknowledge, support, and include victims in the criminal 
justice process.48 
While many of the earliest reforms addressed victims’ services programs 
and the need to ease the burden on crime victims as witnesses,49 later 
proposals dealt with expanding the role of the victim beyond that of a 
witness.50  Some of these proposals included:  allowing victims to 
communicate their views regarding a negotiated guilty plea, permitting the 
use of victim impact statements at the sentencing of convicted offenders, and 
 
 41. See Lepore, supra note 38. 
 42. Id. 
 43. STEVEN DERENE ET AL., NAT’L VICTIM ASSISTANCE ACAD., TRACK 1 PARTICIPANT 
TEXT:  CHAPTER 2:  HISTORY OF THE CRIME VICTIMS’ RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED 
STATES 11 (2007), https://www.ovcttac.gov/views/TrainingMaterials/NVAA/dspNVAA 
Curriculum.cfm [https://perma.cc/6RWH-TDAE]. 
 44. See id.; Josephine Gittler, Expanding the Role of the Victim in a Criminal Action:  An 
Overview of Issues and Problems, 11 PEPP. L. REV. 117, 118–19, 118 nn.4–5 (1984). 
 45. DERENE ET AL., supra note 43, at 8; see also Gittler, supra note 44, at 118 n.4. 
 46. See HERRINGTON ET AL., supra note 2, at ii. 
 47. See id. at vi. 
 48. See id. at 15–85. 
 49. See Gittler, supra note 44, at 123–24.  In 1968, the federal government created the 
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, an agency tasked with, inter alia, funding 
victim-witness programs.  By 1979, it had funded over ninety such programs. See id. at 122 
n.12; Marie Manikis, Contrasting the Emergence of the Victims’ Movements in the United 
States and England and Wales, SOCIETIES, June 2019, at 1, 3.  According to one published 
review, there were 280 such programs in 1980 and by 1990 that number had risen to 5000. 
LESLIE SEBBA, THIRD PARTIES:  VICTIMS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 23 (1996). 
 50. See Gittler, supra note 44, at 121–24. 
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mandating financial restitution to victims as part of sentencing.51  Others 
were more sweeping:  the task force’s report went as far as to endorse the 
adoption of a constitutional amendment that would grant victims the right “to 
be present and to be heard at all critical stages of judicial proceedings.”52 
To date, more than thirty states have passed victim’s rights constitutional 
amendments and all fifty have enacted some statutory victim’s rights.53  
Congress has done its own part—beginning with the Victim and Witness 
Protection Act of 1982,54 it enacted a raft of legislation including the 
Victims’ Rights and Restitution Act of 199055 (VRRA), the Victim Rights 
Clarification Act of 1997,56 and, most recently, the CVRA.57 
B.  Select Considerations for a Victim’s Involvement in the Early Stages of 
the Criminal Justice Process 
The gains in victim participation can be divided broadly into two 
categories:  (1) “service” rights, which encompass institutional responses to 
the needs of victims, including compensation, assistance, and information 
 
 51. See id. at 124; see also LOIS HAIGHT HERRINGTON ET AL., FOUR YEARS LATER:  A 
REPORT ON THE PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME 4 (1986), https:// 
www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ovc/102834.pdf [https://perma.cc/85HR-8PTZ] (summarizing state 
legislation codifying some of the task force’s original victim participation recommendations); 
AM. BAR ASS’N, GUIDELINES FOR FAIR TREATMENT OF VICTIMS AND WITNESSES IN THE 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1983), reprinted in BELOOF, supra note 40, at 80, 80–82 
(enumerating victim inclusion guidelines). 
 52. HERRINGTON ET AL., supra note 2, at 114.  For comprehensive analyses on the merits 
of a victim’s rights constitutional amendment, compare Robert P. Mosteller, The Unnecessary 
Victims’ Rights Amendment, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 443 passim, with Paul G. Cassell, Barbarians 
at the Gates?:  A Reply to the Critics of the Victims’ Rights Amendment, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 
479 passim. 
 53. See About Victims’ Rights, VICTIMLAW (Aug. 2, 2020, 10:44 PM), 
https://victimlaw.org/victimlaw/pages/victimsRight.jsp [https://perma.cc/X4XT-RPDK]; see 
also Jon Kyl et al., On the Wings of Their Angels:  The Scott Campbell, Stephanie Roper, 
Wendy Preston, Louarna Gillis, and Nila Lynn Crime Victims’ Rights Act, 9 LEWIS & CLARK 
L. REV. 581, 587–88 (2005). 
 54. Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 
U.S.C.) (allowing the use of victim impact statements at sentencing). 
 55. Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4820 (repealed 2004) (establishing enumerated 
victim’s rights).  The VRRA was unusually codified in title 42 of the U.S. Code.  Professor 
Paul G. Cassell has argued that this location meant that practitioners, who turned reflexively 
to title 18 for guidance on criminal law, largely did not know about the statute. See Victims’ 
Rights Amendment:  Hearing on H.R.J. Res. 40 Before the Subcomm. on the Const. and Civ. 
Just. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 132–33 (2013) [hereinafter Hearing on 
H.R.J. Res. 40] (statement of Paul G. Cassell, Ronald N. Boyce Presidential Professor of 
Criminal Law, S.J. Quinney College of Law at the University of Utah); H.R. REP. NO. 108-
711, at 4 (2004) (explaining that the need for enacting the CVRA stemmed partly from the 
weaknesses of the VRRA).  The VRRA also provided no means for victims to enforce their 
rights, as was revealed by the nonappealable sequestration of victims in the Oklahoma City 
bombing trial. See David E. Aaronson, New Rights and Remedies:  The Federal Crime 
Victims’ Rights Act of 2004, 28 PACE L. REV. 623, 629 (2008). 
 56. Pub. L. No. 105-6, 111 Stat. 12 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3510) (clarifying 
for judges a victim’s right to attend trial even if the victim plans to speak at sentencing). 
 57. See 150 CONG. REC. 7297 (2004) (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein); Kyl et al., 
supra note 53, at 585–86 (intending to give victims “the right to participate in the system”). 
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regarding developments in the criminal case; and (2) “procedural” rights, 
which permit victims to supply relevant information and their opinions to 
criminal justice authorities at particular junctures.58  Both categories are 
salient in the early stages of a criminal case, when there are articulable 
societal interests in truth seeking59 as a subset of effective crime control and 
in improving victim satisfaction with criminal justice decision-making.60 
Part I.B.1 describes victim alienation broadly and in the lead-up to the 
charging decision.  Part I.B.2 introduces components of procedural justice 
theory that facilitate successful victim involvement. 
1.  Reducing Secondary Victimization and Victim Alienation 
A central motivation of the efforts to achieve and expand participatory 
rights for victims is tackling the problem of secondary victimization—harm 
that the government itself inflicts after the victim is already victimized by the 
crime.61  Victims often describe their experiences with the criminal process 
as retraumatizing, many of them expressing that they faced outright 
hostility.62  Studies that focus on the impact of trials on victims note that even 
where some victims reported being satisfied with the outcome, they found 
the process strenuous and harmful.63  But trials are an increasingly rare 
phenomenon.64  Prosecutors resolve over 95 percent of all convictions 
through pleas.65  So even while victims may have a voice at trial, in reality 
their voices are often excluded entirely, except at sentencing.66  This can 
 
 58. See Manikis, supra note 49, at 35–36. 
 59. See Stacy Caplow, What If There Is No Client?:  Prosecutors as “Counselors” of 
Crime Victims, 5 CLINICAL L. REV. 1, 10–11, 11 n.34 (1998); Michael M. O’Hear, Plea 
Bargaining and Victims:  From Consultation to Guidelines, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 323, 328–29 
(2007). 
 60. See O’Hear, supra note 59, at 326–28; Dana Pugach & Michal Tamir, Nudging the 
Criminal Justice System into Listening to Crime Victims in Plea Agreements, 28 HASTINGS 
WOMEN’S L.J. 45, 54 (2017). 
 61. See BELOOF, supra note 40, at 48; Mary Margaret Giannini, The Procreative Power 
of Dignity:  Dignity’s Evolution in the Victims’ Rights Movement, 9 DREXEL L. REV. 43, 65 
(2016); Jim Parsons & Tiffany Bergin, The Impact of Criminal Justice Involvement on 
Victims’ Mental Health, 23 J. TRAUMATIC STRESS 182, 182–83 (2010); see also 150 CONG. 
REC. 7303 (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl) (“Too often victims of crime experience a secondary 
victimization at the hands of the criminal justice system.”).  But see Henderson, supra note 
30, at 402 (arguing that it is often difficult to attribute victim trauma to the legal process alone 
and that the general lack of empirical information on how the system can best reduce trauma 
does not justify modifying the criminal process around these difficulties). 
 62. See SERED, supra note 29, at 30–31.  One crime victim stated that her “sense of 
disillusionment with the judicial system is many times more painful [than the crime itself]” 
and that “[she] could not, in good faith, urge anyone to participate in [the] hellish process.” 
Giannini, supra note 61, at 64 (first alteration in original) (quoting S. REP. NO. 97-532, at 37 
(1982)). 
 63. See SERED, supra note 29, at 31. 
 64. See id. at 30. 
 65. See id.; Jed S. Rakoff, Why Prosecutors Rule the Criminal Justice System—and What 
Can Be Done About It, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1429, 1432 (2017) (indicating that, in 2015, 2.9 
percent of federal defendants and possibly fewer than 2 percent of state defendants went to 
trial). 
 66. See SERED, supra note 29, at 30. 
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stand in conflict with victims’ needs, as many victims report that they want 
updates on the status of their cases67 and that they wish to have their voices 
heard, their harm publicly acknowledged, and their experiences validated.68  
Studies conducted in the United States and abroad demonstrate that victim 
satisfaction correlates with victims’ sense of inclusion and empowerment in 
the criminal justice process.69  And, conversely, victim dissatisfaction 
correlates with an inability to participate despite an expressed desire to do 
so.70 
Other commentators have tied victim alienation to the “dark figure” of 
unreported crime, suggesting that victims who have experienced alienation 
or trauma induced by the criminal justice system may be reluctant to reach 
out to authorities with their complaints in the future.71  National data shows 
that the strongest predictor of victimization is previous victimization.72  And 
most crime (including violent crime) is, in fact, not reported.73 
These observations highlight the often reactive nature of law enforcement.  
Victims, by way of their ability to “activate[] the machinery of the criminal 
justice system,”74 are initial decision makers and, to the extent that decisions 
made at the earliest points have the greatest capacity to affect the functioning 
of the system, they occupy a critical gatekeeping role.75  From the criminal 
justice system’s perspective, then, it is vital that members of the public are 
willing to participate in and perform such tasks.76 
 
 67. See id. at 39. 
 68. See Parsons & Bergin, supra note 61, at 182. 
 69. See Judith Lewis Herman, The Mental Health of Crime Victims:  Impact of Legal 
Intervention, 16 J. TRAUMATIC STRESS 159, 162–63 (2003). 
 70. See id. at 163. 
 71. See Goldstein, supra note 37, at 518–19; see also HERMAN, supra note 29, at 40–42.  
Whether low reporting or noncooperation is a direct function of negative attitudes about 
criminal justice authorities remains an open question, but survey evidence illustrates that such 
perceptions are a meaningful factor in reporting behavior. See SEBBA, supra note 49, at 111–
12.  One national survey indicates that victims underreport primarily due to a belief that police 
and prosecutors will not help them. See ALL. FOR SAFETY & JUST., CRIME SURVIVORS SPEAK:  
THE FIRST-EVER NATIONAL SURVEY OF VICTIMS’ VIEWS ON SAFETY AND JUSTICE 11 (2016), 
https://allianceforsafetyandjustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Crime-Survivors-Speak-
Report-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/V99L-27Z4].  Other factors that might persuade victims to 
forgo participation include inconvenience, a desire to retain privacy, a lack of influence over 
the process, the perceived inability of the system to effectively solve particular crimes, or a 
rejection of the retributive system of justice. See Douglas Evan Beloof, The Third Model of 
Criminal Process:  The Victim Participation Model, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 289, 306. 
 72. See ALL. FOR SAFETY & JUST., supra note 71, at 7. 
 73. See RACHEL E. MORGAN & BARBARA A. OUDEKERK, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., 
CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 2018, at 8 (2019), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv18.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/W7VS-HWWW]; see also SERED, supra note 29, at 30. 
 74. Karmen, supra note 37, at 158. 
 75. See SEBBA, supra note 49, at 28; see also Deborah P. Kelly, Victims’ Perceptions of 
Criminal Justice, 11 PEPP. L. REV. 15, 20 (1984) (citing studies indicating that 87 percent of 
reported crime is reported by victims). 
 76. See SEBBA, supra note 49, at 28.  Victim’s rights statutory language sometimes 
expressly recognizes the system’s interest in participation. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 7.69.010 (2020) (recognizing “the civic and moral duty of victims . . . to fully and 
voluntarily cooperate with law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies”).  This societal 
interest in participation can sometimes stand in conflict with what Professor Douglas Beloof 
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Parsing negative attitudes in relation to prosecutors alone is a difficult 
enterprise, in part because the prosecutorial function, unlike the police or 
court function, is the least visible among criminal justice authorities.77  But 
one recent national survey indicated that only one in ten victims reported 
receiving assistance from a district attorney’s or prosecutor’s office.78 
This minimization of the victim’s role may be acute at the outset, when the 
prosecutor must decide whether to bring a charge.79  Even though the victim 
frequently retains control over whether to report in the first instance,80 she 
has no formal role in the charging decision.81  Of course, a prosecutor has 
wide discretion to involve the victim informally at this stage and often does.  
Indeed, what a victim brings to the table can be an important part of the 
decision-making behind whether to charge and which particular charges to 
select.82  But a prosecutor is virtually under no obligation to involve a 
 
terms the “Victim Participation Model,” which, at its core, values the “primacy of the 
individual victim” and supports the victim’s subsequent choice in deciding whether to 
participate in the criminal justice process, acknowledging that the prospect of secondary 
victimization may mean different things to different victims. See Beloof, supra note 71, at 
296–98. 
 77. See SEBBA, supra note 49, at 98. 
 78. ALL. FOR SAFETY & JUST., supra note 71, at 11.  A possible explanation for this 
experience is that prosecutors’ offices do not have a culture that emphasizes community 
relations and are otherwise viewed as organizations in which an individual citizen’s interests 
seem unimportant. See SEBBA, supra note 49, at 100.  One scholar describes case processing 
within this organizational structure as “an assembly line” of different actors “without much 
oversight and quality control,” meaning that the prosecutor often has minimal contact with the 
victim. See Caplow, supra note 59, at 14.  In the urban criminal justice context with which she 
is familiar, 
[a]t the early stages of a case, before any decisions about the direction of the 
prosecution have been made, the ADA [Assistant District Attorney] who eventually 
will handle the trial and the plea negotiations has not even been assigned.  Given 
this discontinuity and disconnectedness, it is easy to see how a prosecutor can enter 
a plea bargain or even dismiss a case without the complainant’s knowledge, input, 
or acquiescence. 
Id. 
 79. See Peggy M. Tobolowsky, Victim Participation in the Criminal Justice Process:  
Fifteen Years After the President’s Task Force on Victims of Crime, 25 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. 
& CIV. CONFINEMENT 21, 59 (1999); see also supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
 80. See supra notes 74–76 and accompanying text. 
 81. See Tobolowsky, supra note 79, at 59.  In contrast, the victim often does have a role 
when it comes to decisions regarding pleas, most prominently at a plea hearing where she is 
able to address the court before a plea is entered. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 60(a)(3) (“The 
court must permit a victim to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the district court 
concerning release, plea, or sentencing involving the crime.”); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-
4423(A) (2020) (“On request of the victim, the victim has the right to be present and be heard 
at any proceeding in which a negotiated plea . . . will be presented to the court.”).  Many states 
also require prosecutors to consult with victims regarding plea negotiations. See Tobolowsky, 
supra note 79, at 64 & n.168 (collecting state statutes); see also infra Part II.A.3. 
 82. See Beloof, supra note 71, at 313; Tobolowsky, supra note 79, at 59.  For example, it 
is often the case that an adult rape victim exercises considerable control over whether the 
perpetrator will be charged, a reality that predates even the enactment of victim’s rights laws. 
See Beloof, supra note 71, at 300.  But see generally Angela Corsilles, No-Drop Policies in 
the Prosecution of Domestic Violence Cases:  Guarantee to Action or Dangerous Solution?, 
63 FORDHAM L. REV. 853 (1994) (examining “no-drop” policies that limit a prosecutor’s 
discretion to drop charges where the victim is unwilling to cooperate).  Separately, and 
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victim.83  What might help explain the lack of a formal, enforceable role for 
victims is the settled case law indicating that an exercise of nonprosecution 
discretion, for any reason (or no reason), is unreviewable.84  Another is the 
well-established principle that a victim is not a prosecutor’s client.85  Even 
the language in federal and state victim’s rights laws themselves is deferential 
to prosecutorial discretion.86  To rectify this perceived inequity, one scholar 
has proposed that victims should be accorded an enforceable right to 
participate in the charging decision,87 another has recommended that victims 
 
controversially, prosecutors also routinely consider victim characteristics in deciding whether 
to pursue charges. See, e.g., Tamara Rice Lave, The Prosecutor’s Duty to “Imperfect” Rape 
Victims, 49 TEX. TECH L. REV. 219, 238–39 (2016) (arguing that it is generally unethical for a 
prosecutor to decline rape charges based on characteristics such as the victim’s race or 
socioeconomic status); John W. Stickels et al., Elected Texas District and County Attorneys’ 
Perceptions of Crime Victim Involvement in Criminal Prosecutions, 14 TEX. WESLEYAN L. 
REV. 1, 7–9 (2007) (discussing nonlegal factors such as a victim’s age, gender, race, and 
employment status). 
 83. See Beloof, supra note 71, at 313; Tobolowsky, supra note 79, at 59.  There are a few 
exceptions as some states have enacted legislation providing victims an opportunity to confer 
with or submit statements to prosecutors prior to a final charging decision. See, e.g., ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. § 13-4408(B); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258B, § 3(g) (West 2020); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 52:4B-36(m) (West 2020); see also infra Part II.A.3. 
 84. See, e.g., Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (“[A] private citizen 
lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.”); 
Inmates of Attica Corr. Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 379 (2d Cir. 1973) (“[F]ederal 
courts have traditionally and, to our knowledge, uniformly refrained from overturning, at the 
instance of a private person, discretionary decisions of federal prosecuting authorities not to 
prosecute persons regarding whom a complaint of criminal conduct is made.”).  As the U.S. 
Supreme Court elaborated when addressing passive prosecutorial enforcement, examining the 
government’s charging discretion reveals the limitations of judicial review. See Wayte v. 
United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (“This broad discretion rests largely on the 
recognition that the decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review.  Such 
factors as the strength of the case, the prosecution’s general deterrence value, the 
Government’s enforcement priorities, and the case’s relationship to the Government’s overall 
enforcement plan are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent 
to undertake.  Judicial supervision in this area, moreover, entails systemic costs of particular 
concern.”); see also supra note 32 and accompanying text.  A limited exception to 
unreviewability exists under the Constitution for selective prosecution based on impermissible 
criteria such as race, but such claims are largely futile due to the difficulty of obtaining 
discovery. See Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race:  The Power and Privilege of 
Discretion, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 42–46 (1998). 
 85. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.8 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) (“A 
prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate.”); 
Caplow, supra note 59, at 4–5 (noting the “critical absence of an individual client to whom a 
[prosecutor] owes allegiance” and that “[n]one of the values embraced by client-centered 
decision making” are present “in the prosecutorial decision about whether, whom and what to 
charge”); Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial Discretion:  The Difficulty and Necessity of Public 
Inquiry, 123 DICK. L. REV. 589, 596 (2019) (“Crime victims may express their preferences 
and may even have a legal right to weigh in, but they are not clients.”). 
 86. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(6) (“Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to impair 
the prosecutorial discretion of the Attorney General or any officer under his direction.”); OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 2930.06(A) (West 2020) (indicating that a “prosecutor’s failure to confer 
with a victim . . . do[es] not affect the validity” of a decision to dismiss charges, a plea, or any 
other disposition); see also infra Part II.B.3. 
 87. See Sarah N. Welling, Victims in the Criminal Process:  A Utilitarian Analysis of 
Victim Participation in the Charging Decision, 30 ARIZ. L. REV. 85, 105–16 (1988). 
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should be able to seek judicial review of a nonprosecution decision,88 and yet 
another has gone as far as to suggest that victims should hold veto power.89  
Setting aside the merits or likelihood of implementing such remedies, other 
scholars have endorsed elements of procedural justice theory to improve 
victim satisfaction with criminal justice decision-making broadly, 
notwithstanding the outcomes of such decisions.90  The next section 
introduces procedural justice theory and its purported utility for 
accomplishing this goal. 
2.  Procedural Justice as a Vehicle for Inclusion 
Procedural justice theory posits that individuals base their ideas of fairness 
not just on the substance of a particular authority’s final decision but also on 
the process by which that decision was reached.91  Social psychology 
research reveals that while decision makers evaluate fairness primarily based 
on outcomes, decision recipients focus primarily on the processes.92  More 
specifically, “people care whether their treatment (and not simply their 
outcomes) is fair because fair treatment indicates something critically 
important to them—their status within their social group.”93  Membership in 
a social group provides self-validation.94  When individuals believe that they 
are being excluded, especially by an authority figure representing the state, 
their sense of dignity erodes.95  As the procedural justice theorist Tom Tyler 
explains, “[p]eople value the affirmation of their status by legal authorities 
as competent, equal, citizens and human beings, and they regard procedures 
as unfair if they are not consistent with that affirmation.”96 
To the extent that victims’ experiences do not comport with these 
procedural justice norms, victims may question the legitimacy of decision 
makers and consequently avoid cooperating with authorities in the future.97  
Scholars have proposed that legal authorities focus on four core attributes of 
the process:  whether (1) victims have an opportunity to share their stories 
 
 88. See Paul S. Hudson, The Crime Victim and the Criminal Justice System:  Time for a 
Change, 11 PEPP. L. REV. 23, 58 (1984). 
 89. See Beloof, supra note 71, at 313. 
 90. See, e.g., Mary Margaret Giannini, Redeeming an Empty Promise:  Procedural 
Justice, the Crime Victims’ Rights Act, and the Victim’s Right to Be Reasonably Protected 
from the Accused, 78 TENN. L. REV. 47, 85–103 (2010); O’Hear, supra note 59, at 326–32.  
The utility of procedural justice in victim’s rights reform has also been explored in the British 
criminal justice system. See generally Mary Iliadis & Asher Flynn, Providing a Check on 
Prosecutorial Decision-Making:  An Analysis of the Victims’ Right to Review Reform, 58 BRIT. 
J. CRIMINOLOGY 550 (2017). 
 91. Giannini, supra note 90, at 85; Michael M. O’Hear, Plea Bargaining and Procedural 
Justice, 42 GA. L. REV. 407, 420–22 (2008). 
 92. O’Hear, supra note 91, at 412. 
 93. Giannini, supra note 90, at 89 (quoting Dale T. Miller, Disrespect and the Experience 
of Injustice, 52 ANN. REV. PSYCH. 527, 529–30 (2001)). 
 94. See id. at 90. 
 95. See id. 
 96. Tom R. Tyler, The Psychological Consequences of Judicial Procedures:  Implications 
for Civil Commitment Hearings, 46 SMU L. REV. 433, 440–41 (1992). 
 97. See Giannini, supra note 90, at 88; O’Hear, supra note 59, at 327. 
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(“voice”), (2) the authorities are unbiased (“neutrality”), (3) the authorities 
are caring and reliable (“trustworthiness”), and (4) victims are treated with 
dignity and respect (“dignity”).98  In short, even when victims disagree with 
the final outcome, such as a negative charging decision or the terms of a 
particular plea agreement, the presence of these attributes can nonetheless 
cultivate a positive relationship with criminal justice authorities.99  
Moreover, the four-factor approach outlined above helps accomplish two 
major goals of the criminal justice system.  The first, which parallels the aims 
of victim’s rights laws, is to send a message to the victim that reaffirms their 
dignity and reduces secondary victimization.100  The second is to further the 
system’s utilitarian agenda, which includes not only the immediate goals of 
accurate guilt determination and proportionate punishment101 but also the 
larger aims of advancing effective crime control, promoting public respect 
for criminal justice decision-making, and building a “satisfied citizenry.”102 
Before this Note proceeds in Part III to apply procedural justice principles 
to victim conferral in certain nonprosecution postures,103 Part II introduces 
the right to confer and assesses its legal foundations.  Part II chiefly discusses 
the interrelated questions of (1) whether there is a basis to extend the 
conferral right to instances where there are no charges and (2) what the law 
contemplates conferral to include. 
II.  EXAMINING THE EXISTING RIGHT TO CONFER 
The right to confer, as described by a leading hornbook on criminal 
procedure, is the “most ambiguous of the lot” of victim consultation 
requirements, which exist both at the federal level and in about two-thirds of 
the states.104  Much of the uncertainty derives from the laws themselves.  
Many state provisions fail to specify when conferral must begin, nor do they 
provide any hint as to its contemplated subject matter.105  Some state 
provisions, however, expressly extend the conferral right in plea negotiations 
or plea agreements.106  But, few require conferral regarding an exercise of 
nonprosecution discretion.107 
The statutory language establishing the federal CVRA right to confer also 
lacks clarity.108  This uncertainty across jurisdictions is partly explained by 
a lack of case law.  Vindicating their rights in court is prohibitively expensive 
 
 98. Giannini, supra note 90, at 90–91; O’Hear, supra note 59, at 326–27. 
 99. See O’Hear, supra note 59, at 326–27. 
 100. See Giannini, supra note 90, at 91. 
 101. O’Hear, supra note 59, at 326–27. 
 102. See Giannini, supra note 90, at 88–89. 
 103. Scholars have previously proposed applying these principles to the victim’s right to 
be reasonably protected from the accused, see id. at 96–103, and to plea bargaining with a 
defendant. See O’Hear, supra note 59, at 326–32. 
 104. 5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 21.3(f) (4th ed. 2019). 
 105. See infra Parts II.A.3, II.B.3. 
 106. See infra Part II.A.3. 
 107. See infra Parts II.A.3, II.B.3. 
 108. See infra Part II.A.1. 
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for most victims,109 is only an option at the federal level and in a few states, 
and is often dependent on an unpromising petition for a writ of mandamus.110 
With these shortcomings in mind, Part II focuses on two related inquiries.  
First, Part II.A examines the availability of a conferral right in the absence of 
charges.  Second, Part II.B inspects what the law expects conferral to include. 
A.  Does the Conferral Right Exist Precharge? 
Part II.A.1 focuses on the CVRA’s legislative history and case law, as well 
as the DOJ’s interpretations of the conferral right’s precharge applicability.  
Part II.A.2 considers a proposed amendment to the CVRA and its possible 
impact on the legal framework.  Finally, Part II.A.3 briefly examines state 
conferral rights and their precharge status. 
1.  The CVRA 
The CVRA was enacted with nearly unanimous support and little 
discussion.111  It borrowed much of its language from earlier failed proposals 
to adopt a victim’s rights constitutional amendment, which would have 
naturally applied in both state and federal contexts.112  As a result, its 
phrasing is “sparse” in “technical detail” and lacking in procedural 
guidance.113  Even so, Senator Dianne Feinstein, a cosponsor of the CVRA, 
proclaimed that the right to confer is “intended to be expansive” and applies 
to “any critical stage or disposition of the case.”114 
But most courts have not been willing to interpret this right, or any CVRA 
right, quite so broadly.115  The Eleventh Circuit,116 Sixth Circuit,117 Eastern 
District of New York,118 District of Connecticut,119 Northern District of 
 
 109. See Pugach & Tamir, supra note 60, at 51.  Scholars have noted that both the 
government and the defense possess a litigation cost advantage over the victim. Id. at 51 n.40.  
For example, most of the published CVRA mandamus petitions between 2012 and 2017 reveal 
cases where victims faced fewer resource constraints, either because they were corporations, 
aggregated to file suit, or stood to recover a large restitution reward. Id. at 51 & n.41. 
 110. See, e.g., S.C. CONST. art. I, § 24(B) (indicating that the enumerated rights may be 
subject to a writ of mandamus); 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3) (directing victims to petition the court 
of appeals for a writ of mandamus if the district court denies the relief sought); UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 77-38-11(2)(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2020) (permitting victims to bring an action for a writ 
of mandamus defining or enforcing their rights). 
 111. Fed. Ins. Co. v. United States, 882 F.3d 348, 357–58 (2d Cir. 2018). 
 112. Id. at 358. 
 113. Id. 
 114. 150 CONG. REC. 7302 (2004) (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein).  Senator Jon Kyl, 
another cosponsor, agreed. Id. at 22,952. 
 115. See infra notes 117–21 and accompanying text. 
 116. See In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196, 1196 (11th Cir.), vacated, reh’g en banc granted, No. 
19-13843, 2020 WL 4557083 (11th Cir. Aug. 7, 2020) (mem.). 
 117. See In re Acker, 596 F.3d 370, 373 (6th Cir. 2010) (noting it is “uncertain” whether a 
CVRA right can attach prior to the filing of charges). 
 118. See United States v. Rubin, 558 F. Supp. 2d 411, 429 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 119. See United States v. Daly, No. 11cr121, 2012 WL 315409, at *4 (D. Conn. Feb. 1, 
2012) (holding that CVRA rights attach “no sooner than the point in time when an offense has 
been charged”). 
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Indiana,120 and Northern District of Ohio121 have each declined to recognize 
an enforceable CVRA right prior to the filing of a charging instrument. 
In United States v. Rubin,122 the Eastern District of New York found that 
CVRA rights attached only once the alleged criminal conduct involving the 
victims was incorporated and charged in a superseding indictment.123  The 
court still acknowledged the inherent difficulty in locating a point in time 
when such rights should attach.124  It noted that, “[q]uite understandably, 
movants perceive their victimization as having begun long before the 
government got around to filing the superseding indictment.”125  But the 
court also underscored the problems associated with granting rights before 
the commencement of a criminal case.126  Such rights would have to be 
circumscribed by “logical limits” as it would be inaccurate to read the CVRA 
to “include the victims of uncharged crimes that the government has not even 
contemplated.”127 
a.  In re Wild:  The CVRA’s Precharge Applicability Under a Microscope 
Given the relative lack of CVRA case law, this year’s fifty-three-page 
Eleventh Circuit decision (and sixty-seven-page dissent) in the Epstein 
litigation is by far the most exhaustive judicial analysis of the CVRA’s 
precharge applicability.128  The majority held that, as a matter of first 
impression, the right to confer—and the entire CVRA—attaches only when 
criminal proceedings are initiated, relying on:  (1) the text and structure of 
the CVRA, (2) the historical context surrounding its passage, and (3) the 
prosecutorial discretion it intends to safeguard.129 
Looking to the CVRA’s text and structure, the court evaluated each of the 
eight enumerated rights and held that all attach following the institution of 
criminal proceedings.130  Four of the eight rights, by their own terms, apply 
 
 120. See In re Petersen, No. 10-CV-298, 2010 WL 5108692, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 8, 2010) 
(holding that the CVRA right to confer arises only after a defendant is charged). 
 121. See United States v. Merkosky, No. 02cr-0168-01, 2008 WL 1744762, at *2 (N.D. 
Ohio Apr. 11, 2008) (concurring with authorities for the proposition that CVRA rights attach 
only when a prosecution is underway). 
 122. 558 F. Supp. 2d 411 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 123. See id. at 429. 
 124. See id. at 419. 
 125. Id. 
 126. See id. 
 127. Id.  Some commentators have taken the Rubin court’s language to mean that it 
expressly recognized the expansive nature of CVRA rights and left open the possibility that 
they may attach prior to indictment. See Paul G. Cassell et al., Crime Victims’ Rights During 
Criminal Investigations?:  Applying the Crime Victims’ Rights Act Before Criminal Charges 
Are Filed, 104 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 59, 74 (2014). 
 128. See generally In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196 (11th Cir.), vacated, reh’g en banc granted, 
No. 19-13843, 2020 WL 4557083 (11th Cir. Aug. 7, 2020) (mem.).  Though the Eleventh 
Circuit has since agreed to rehear the case en banc—and in so doing vacated the panel’s earlier 
denial of a writ of mandamus—the April decision’s extensive analysis still warrants a deeper 
discussion here. 
 129. Id. at 1205. 
 130. Id. at 1206–08. 
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to “proceedings.”131  The court noted that a fifth right, which guarantees 
victims protection from the “accused,” is best read to presuppose the 
charging of a defendant.132  It also found a sixth right, which provides victims 
“full and timely restitution,” to presuppose initiation, and even termination, 
of a criminal proceeding.133  The remaining two rights formed the basis for 
the petition.134 
As for the “reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the Government 
in the case,” the court held that two contextual reasons counsel in favor of 
finding that, as used in the provision, “the case” indicates an ongoing judicial 
proceeding as opposed to an investigation.135  First, the majority stated that 
a “case” specifically in the criminal context signifies that a proceeding has 
commenced.136  Second, the majority stated that a pending case makes a 
singular “attorney for the Government” easily identifiable.  For the same 
reason, the court noted that there are many investigations to which no 
attorney is assigned.137  And, finally, as for the “right to be treated with 
fairness and with respect,” the court observed that it has no temporal 
restriction, explicit or implicit.138  On balance, then, and in light of the 
statutory canon noscitur a sociis—that words are understood by the company 
they keep—the court held that this final right is also best read to apply 
postcharge.139 
Wild’s main textualist arguments dealt with the CVRA’s “coverage” and 
“venue” provisions.140  The first provision states that DOJ officers “engaged 
in the detection, investigation, or prosecution of crime” must make best 
efforts to ensure victims are notified of and accorded their rights.141  Though 
the use of “detection” and “investigation” appear to bear on the temporal 
scope of CVRA rights, the majority held that this provision is best read as a 
“to whom” and not a “when” provision.142  By the same token, the majority 
 
 131. Id. at 1206; see also supra note 7. 
 132. In re Wild, 955 F.3d at 1206; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(1) (“The right to be 
reasonably protected from the accused.”). 
 133. In re Wild, 955 F.3d. at 1207; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(6) (“The right to full and 
timely restitution as provided in law.”). 
 134. See In re Wild, 955 F.3d. at 1207.  
 135. See id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(5). 
 136. See In re Wild, 955 F.3d. at 1207.  The dissent supplied its own textualist arguments 
for why a criminal “case” is inclusive of an investigation. See id. at 1239 (Hull, J., dissenting). 
 137. Id. at 1207–08.  The dissent noted that, as a practical matter, prosecutors are routinely 
assigned to handle precharge matters and that this is especially unremarkable in white-collar 
cases where defense counsel negotiate with already assigned prosecutors to obtain favorable 
preindictment plea deals. See id. at 1240 (Hull, J., dissenting). 
 138. See id. at 1208 (majority opinion). 
 139. Id.  The dissent found the plain text of both rights invoked in the petition to be 
unambiguous.  That is, it treated as intentional Congress’s choice not to explicitly anchor these 
two rights in temporal contexts such as a “proceeding.” See id. at 1236 (Hull, J., dissenting). 
 140. See id. at 1210. 
 141. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(c)(1) (“Officers and employees of the Department of Justice and 
other departments and agencies of the United States engaged in the detection, investigation, 
or prosecution of crime shall make their best efforts to see that crime victims are notified of, 
and accorded, the rights described in subsection (a).”). 
 142. In re Wild, 955 F.3d at 1210. 
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noted that were it not to adopt that reading, there would be no textual basis 
limiting the CVRA’s applicability to a later stage, such as the NPA 
context.143  It would open the floodgates to requiring law enforcement 
officers to consult with victims before convening a lineup, conducting a raid, 
or obtaining a search warrant.144 
The majority conceded that Wild stood on firmer ground with respect to 
the venue provision.145  This provision directs victims to assert their rights 
either in the court in which the defendant is being prosecuted or, “if no 
prosecution is underway,” in the court in which the crime occurred.146  Both 
the dissent and the lower court agreed that “no prosecution is underway” 
must necessarily mean that the defendant has not yet been charged.147  The 
majority acknowledged that this is a plausible reading.148  But when 
considering the remainder of the CVRA’s text and the adverse practical 
implications of Wild’s interpretation, the majority discussed alternative 
readings of the venue provision more consistent with its own 
interpretation.149 
In its preferred reading, the majority noted that “no prosecution is 
underway” could refer to the time between the filing of a criminal complaint 
and a formal indictment.150  The majority supported this reading by citing the 
well-established precedent that, for the purposes of the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel, a “prosecution” begins at a defendant’s initial appearance 
before a judicial officer, not at the filing of a complaint.151  The court 
reasoned that this reading sensibly applies where, for instance, a victim 
wishes to confer with the prosecutor after the filing of a complaint about 
whether the defendant should be granted pretrial release at the initial 
appearance.152 
Next, the court looked at the CVRA’s historical context and compared the 
Act to the earlier VRRA.153  The VRRA, by its own terms, grants victims 
certain precharge rights and services.154  In essence, the court observed that 
Congress obviously knew about the VRRA when it enacted the CVRA, 
which repealed portions of the VRRA but left intact those provisions that 
supply precharge rights and services.155  Because Congress knows how to 
extend precharge rights to victims expressly, the court found Congress’s 
 
 143. See id. at 1211. 
 144. See id. 
 145. See id. at 1212. 
 146. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3); see also infra note 169 and accompanying text. 
 147. See In re Wild, 955 F.3d at 1212, 1238. 
 148. See id. at 1212. 
 149. See id. 
 150. See id. 
 151. See id.  The dissent responded by indicating that, also for the purposes of a 
“prosecution,” the Sixth Amendment’s speedy trial right can apply as early as the time of 
arrest. See id. at 1238 n.17 (Hull, J., dissenting). 
 152. See id. at 1213. 
 153. See id. at 1214. 
 154. See id. 
 155. See id. at 1214–15. 
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silence when enacting the CVRA, in the face of this knowledge, to be 
intentional.156 
The court termed its final consideration—the principle of prosecutorial 
discretion—a “weighty one.”157  Section 3771(d)(6) of the CVRA explicitly 
prohibits any interpretation of the entire CVRA that “impair[s] the discretion 
of the Attorney General or any officer under his direction.”158  The court then 
indicated two ways in which the CVRA’s precharge applicability would 
“impair” the very discretion the CVRA seeks to safeguard.159 
First, to claim statutory protection under the CVRA, victims must 
demonstrate to the court that they are crime victims as defined by the Act.160  
A victim must be “a person directly and proximately harmed as a result of 
the commission of a Federal offense.”161  In the absence of any charges, the 
court observed that it was ill-equipped to make this determination because 
doing so would entail conducting a “trial” and making legal findings about 
offenses yet to be identified.162  Such a proceeding, the court concluded, 
would “exert enormous pressure” on the charging decision and likely impair 
an ongoing investigation.163 
Second, the court held that its enforcement of precharge CVRA rights 
would both quantitatively and qualitatively intrude on prosecutorial 
discretion.164  Quantitatively, the court stated that interventions would be 
multiplied as judges would be empowered to compel prosecutors to consult 
with victims before witness interviews, warrant applications, interrogations, 
and the like.165  Qualitatively, the court stated that the principle of separation 
of powers counsels that unless and until charges are filed—at which point the 
prosecutor cedes some control and management of the case to the court—the 
prosecutor’s discretion is both “exclusive” and “absolute.”166  The court 
concluded that recognizing enforceable precharge rights would 
“contravene[] the background expectation of executive exclusivity.”167 
 
 156. See id. at 1215.  Wild did not proceed under the VRRA because, as mentioned above, 
it does not grant judicially enforceable rights. See id. at 1215 n.22. 
 157. Id. at 1216. 
 158. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(6). 
 159. See In re Wild, 955 F.3d at 1216. 
 160. Id. at 1217. 
 161. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(e)(2). 
 162. See In re Wild, 955 F.3d at 1217. 
 163. Id. 
 164. See id. at 1218. 
 165. See id.  The dissent contended that the statute itself provides the desired limiting 
principles by, inter alia, qualifying the right to confer as a “reasonable”  right and by explicitly 
safeguarding prosecutorial discretion. See id. at 1246 (Hull, J., dissenting).  But the dissent 
found the late, indictment-drafting stage in Epstein’s case to warrant attachment of the 
conferral right. See id.  The majority construed this latter reasoning as one cleverly crafted to 
capture the facts of this case without risking a slippery slope. See id. at 1221. 
 166. Id. at 1218. 
 167. Id.  Apart from setting forth its own textualist arguments for why the CVRA right to 
confer applies precharge, the dissent also countered the majority’s floodgates and separation 
of powers by observing that “since the Fifth Circuit’s 2008 [In re Dean] decision and the 
District Court’s 2011 [Doe I] decision, there has been no flood of civil suits by victims, no 
evidence of victims’ abuse of their CVRA rights, and no prosecutors’ complaints about 
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As of this writing, while we await a new opinion from an en banc Eleventh 
Circuit, there appear to be only two federal courts remaining that have 
extended the CVRA conferral right to the precharge stages of a case.  Twelve 
years ago, the Fifth Circuit, albeit in a case where the issue was not contested 
by the parties, stated that the right to confer can apply specifically in 
precharge plea negotiations.168  The court asserted that Congress, by 
enacting the CVRA, made a “policy decision” that victims have a right to 
inform the plea bargaining process by conferring with the government prior 
to the signing of an agreement.169  And eleven years ago, the Eastern District 
of Virginia, in an unpublished opinion regarding a motion in limine, agreed 
with the Fifth Circuit’s decision that the CVRA can apply prior to a plea 
agreement.170 
b.  DOJ’s Narrow Reading 
DOJ’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) contends that CVRA rights only 
apply once the government brings formal charges.171  In a sixteen-page 
opinion, the OLC analyzes the CVRA’s “text, structure, purpose, and 
legislative history,” concluding that this position is the best reading of the 
statute.172 
Some of the OLC’s arguments, including those supporting its 
interpretation of “the case” and “the attorney for the Government” within the 
CVRA’s right to confer, were informally adopted by the Eleventh Circuit in 
its recent decision.173  The OLC acknowledges that its narrow reading may 
reduce the impact of victim participation, for instance, at a plea hearing 
(assuming that there was no prior conferral), but it nonetheless emphasizes 
 
impairment of their prosecutorial discretion.” Id. at 1226 (Hull, J., dissenting).  But see supra 
note 111 and accompanying text (describing cost barriers that victims face to file suit and 
vindicate their rights). 
 168. See In re Dean, 527 F.3d 391, 394 (5th Cir. 2008).  As the In re Wild majority noted, 
the Fifth Circuit’s discussion of the CVRA’s precharge rights was technically dicta, given its 
ultimate ruling. See In re Wild, 955 F.3d at 1219 n.25. 
 169. In re Dean, 527 F.3d at 395. 
 170. See United States v. Okun, No. 08cr132, 2009 WL 790042, at *2 (E.D. Va. Mar. 24, 
2009). 
 171. The Availability of Crime Victims’ Rights Under the Crime Victims’ Rights Act of 
2004, 35 Op. O.L.C. 1, 1 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 OLC Opinion].  Though the document is 
now ten years old, OLC opinions are treated as binding within the executive branch. See 
Trevor W. Morrison, Stare Decisis in the Office of Legal Counsel, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1448, 
1451 (2010).  For an opposing perspective on the OLC’s legal analysis, see generally Cassell 
et al., supra note 127.  Senator Jon Kyl also contested the OLC’s conclusions and subsequently 
wrote two letters to then Attorney General Eric Holder arguing that the CVRA right to confer 
was intended to attach precharge. See 157 CONG. REC. S7060–61 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 2011) 
(statement of Sen. Jon Kyl); 157 CONG. REC. S3608–09 (daily ed. June 8, 2011) (statement of 
Sen. Jon Kyl). 
 172. 2010 OLC Opinion, supra note 171, at 4. 
 173. Id. at 8–9. 
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that prosecutors remain free to exercise their discretion to confer when they 
please.174 
On this point, the OLC’s disclaimer at the outset is noteworthy—it claims 
that its final opinion is limited to examining statutory obligations under the 
CVRA and that it contains no opinion on whether the DOJ should provide 
rights prior to the filing of charges “as a matter of good practice.”175  Finally, 
and most salient to this Note’s inquiry, the OLC unequivocally states that 
conferral does not apply in the context of charging decisions, which it 
believes are “beyond the ambit” of the CVRA.176 
Turning to the DOJ’s guidelines, it is clear that the department has adopted 
the OLC opinion.  In the latest version of the “Attorney General Guidelines 
for Victim and Witness Assistance” (“AG Guidelines”), the DOJ states that 
“CVRA rights attach when criminal proceedings are initiated by complaint, 
information, or indictment.”177  Perhaps as a nod to the OLC’s “good 
practice” language, the AG Guidelines assert that prosecutors “should make 
reasonable efforts” to both notify victims and consider their views about 
“prospective plea negotiations.”178  There is no mention of conferral 
regarding a decision not to proceed with a prosecution.179 
c.  Congress’s 2015 CVRA Amendment 
In 2015, Congress amended the CVRA, most prominently adding a ninth 
enumerated right “to be informed in a timely manner of any plea bargain or 
deferred prosecution agreement.”180  The House of Representatives’ report 
accompanying the legislation expressly noted that pursuant to the OLC 
opinion, federal prosecutors had not been required to notify victims about a 
plea agreement or deferred prosecution agreement (DPA) that was finalized 
prior to the filing of a formal charge.181  The amendment thus clarified 
 
 174. Id. at 10.  The OLC noted that a subdivision of DOJ, the Environmental and Natural 
Resources Division, had recommended in an internal memo that the conferral right should 
apply to precharge plea negotiations. Id. at 9. 
 175. Id. at 2.  This distinction between legal obligations and good practice also featured in 
the Eleventh Circuit’s recent decision. See In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196, 1221 (11th Cir.), 
vacated, reh’g en banc granted, No. 19-13843, 2020 WL 4557083 (11th Cir. Aug. 7, 2020) 
(mem.). 
 176. 2010 OLC Opinion, supra note 171, at 9–10. 
 177. OFF. OF JUST. PROGRAMS, ATTORNEY GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR VICTIM AND WITNESS 
ASSISTANCE 8 (2012), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olp/docs/ag_ 
guidelines2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/VST9-MBMF]. 
 178. Id. at 41; 2010 OLC Opinion, supra note 171, at 2. 
 179. OFF. OF JUST. PROGRAMS, supra note 177, at 41–42. 
 180. Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 144-22, 129 Stat. 227, 240 
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(9)–(10)).  Plea agreements and DPAs are similar in that both 
require court involvement, while NPAs do not. See United States v. Fokker Servs. B.V., 818 
F.3d 733, 738 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (explaining that charges are filed subject to DPAs, but that 
none are filed subject to NPAs, where the agreement is maintained by the parties alone).  
Separately, the In re Wild decision considered the CVRA at the time the underlying litigation 
commenced (2008), and so it did not incorporate this amendment into its analysis.  See In re 
Wild, 955 F.3d at 1231 (Hull, J., dissenting). 
 181. See H.R. REP. NO. 114-7, at 7 (2015). 
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Congress’s intent that crime victims be notified of such agreements, even if 
they are reached precharge.182  Shortly after the amendment was enacted, the 
DOJ filed a brief in the Southern District of New York, again arguing that 
the CVRA applies only after criminal charges are filed or in the “closely-
related context of plea bargains or deferred prosecution agreements.”183  In 
short, the DOJ maintained that outside the narrow context of the newly 
enacted amendment, CVRA rights were still tied to the commencement of 
criminal proceedings.184 
As this section has illustrated, courts have mainly confronted the issue of 
a precharge right to confer in the context of either plea negotiations or related 
negotiations implicating an NPA.  Outside of the Epstein litigation 
culminating with In re Wild, no federal court has addressed whether the 
CVRA right to confer exists in a nonprosecution posture.185  The next section 
briefly examines pending legislation to further amend the CVRA and 
discusses its implications for a precharge right to confer. 
2.  The Proposed Amendment to the CVRA 
On October 17, 2019, Representative Jackie Speier introduced the 
Courtney Wild Crime Victims’ Rights Reform Act of 2019,186 named in 
honor of Epstein’s victim.187  The bill proposes to expand the right to confer 
to include conferral “about any plea bargain or other resolution of the case 
before such plea bargain or resolution is presented to the court or otherwise 
finalized.”188  Relatedly, it seeks to further amend the 2015 enactment of the 
right to notification of plea bargains and DPAs by adding the right to 
 
 182. Id. 
 183. See Reply Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Respondents’ Motion to 
Dismiss the Petition at 5, Jordan v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 173 F. Supp. 3d 44 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) 
(No. 15 Civ. 1028), ECF No. 17. 
 184. Id.  In a 2017 brief filed in the Southern District of Florida, DOJ read the new 
amendment to not require advance notice of a plea offer or a proposed deferred prosecution 
agreement but rather notice “in a timely manner” after such an agreement has come into 
existence. See Government’s Response and Opposition to Petitioners’ Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment and Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment at 8, Doe III, 359 F. Supp. 3d 
1201 (S.D. Fla. 2019) (No. 08 Civ. 80736), ECF No. 408. 
 185. See Jordan, 173 F. Supp. 3d at 51 (observing that no federal court has addressed 
whether CVRA rights can be invoked at pre-negotiation stages, such as the investigatory 
stage); KERSTIN BRAUN, VICTIM PARTICIPATION RIGHTS:  VARIATION ACROSS CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEMS 109–10 (2019) (noting that the application of CVRA rights to a 
nonprosecution context appears “opaque”). 
 186. H.R. 4729, 116th Cong. (2019).  Among its proposals are a fee-shifting provision for 
attorneys’ fees and expenses and an award of up to $15,000 for intentional violations of CVRA 
rights. See id. §§ 2–3.  Given the existing cost barriers to vindicating CVRA rights, these 
provisions may help relieve such burdens. See supra note 109 and accompanying text 
 187. See Press Release, Congresswoman Jackie Speier, Rep. Speier Introduces Bipartisan 
Courtney Wild Crime Victims’ Rights Reform Act of 2019 to Rectify Injustices Faced by 
Epstein’s Victims, (Oct. 17, 2019), https://speier.house.gov/2019/10/rep-speier-introduces-
bipartisan-courtney-wild-crime-victims-rights-reform-act-of-2019-to-rectify-injustices-faced 
-by-epstein-s-victims [https://perma.cc/44L5-UAZK]. 
 188. H.R. 4729 § 2(1)(A) (emphasis added). 
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notification of NPAs and any “referral of a criminal investigation to another 
Federal, State, or local law enforcement entity.”189 
At first glance, the provisions appear to target NPAs and associated 
referrals alone, at least those that bear a resemblance to the ones employed 
in the Epstein litigation.  But the proposed amendment’s reference to “other 
resolution[s]” may encompass certain other nonprosecution decisions.190  As 
of this writing, the bill has not left the committee—it was first introduced in 
the House Judiciary Committee and then referred to the Subcommittee on 
Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security about a month later.191 
3.  State Law Survey 
State constitutions are replete with examples of broad language granting 
rights to confer without supplying any context.192  States’ statutory conferral 
rights that do contain specific language refer predominantly to plea 
negotiations and plea agreements.193  In so doing, they often explicitly 
provide for conferral rights only after a prosecutor files charges and dispel 
the idea that such rights could apply, for instance, to precharge plea 
negotiations.194  And unlike the CVRA, state provisions generally provide 
no enforcement mechanisms to vindicate rights, meaning that few courts 
have ever addressed the narrow question of whether conferral rights attach in 
the absence of charges.195 
There are, however, a few states that appear to grant victims a conferral 
right with respect to an exercise of nonprosecution discretion.  Tennessee 
requires that its prosecutors confer with victims prior to a final disposition, 
 
 189. Id. § 2(1)(B). 
 190. Id. § 2(1)(A). 
 191. See H.R. 4729—Courtney Wild Crime Victims’ Rights Reform Act of 2019, 
CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/4729/committees 
[https://perma.cc/PY3K-BZHH] (last visited June 22, 2020). 
 192. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 24 (granting “the right to confer with the 
prosecution”); ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1(a)(4) (granting “[t]he right to communicate with the 
prosecution”); MICH. CONST. art. I, § 24(1) (granting the “right to confer with the 
prosecution”); N.C. CONST. art. I, § 37(1a)(h) (granting “the right to reasonably confer with 
the prosecution”); TEX. CONST. art. I, § 30(b)(3) (granting “the right to confer with a 
representative of the prosecutor’s office”).  But see, e.g., S.C. CONST. art. I, § 24(A)(7) 
(granting the right to “confer with the prosecution, after the crime against the victim has been 
charged, before the trial or before any disposition and [be] informed of the disposition”). 
 193. See OFF. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, LEGAL SERIES BULLETIN # 7:  VICTIM INPUT INTO PLEA 
AGREEMENTS 1–2 (2002), https://www.ncjrs.gov/ovc_archives/bulletins/legalseries/ 
bulletin7/ncj189188.pdf [https://perma.cc/4WGP-TYZJ]; see also Tobolowsky, supra note 
79, at 63–65, 64 nn.168–71. 
 194. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 104, § 13.1(a); Brown, supra note 32, at 880.  This 
treatment of conferral rights with prosecutors stands in contrast to notification rights in 
relation to law enforcement broadly, which most states do provide early in the criminal 
process, see Cassell et al., supra note 127, at 102, as does the federal government. See 34 
U.S.C. § 20141(c)(3) (enumerating notice requirements to victims by a “responsible official”). 
 195. See Cassell et al., supra note 127, at 101; see also, e.g., Ex parte Littlefield, 540 S.E.2d 
81, 85 n.5 (S.C. 2000) (holding that victims obtain the right to confer once the case proceeds 
to indictment). 
2020] SECRET FAITS ACCOMPLIS 367 
such as the “decision not to proceed with a criminal prosecution.”196  
Massachusetts provides victims with an opportunity to confer with the 
prosecution before, inter alia, an “act by the commonwealth terminating the 
prosecution.”197  Meanwhile, Arizona not only requires that prosecutors 
confer with victims regarding their views on a “decision not to proceed with 
a criminal prosecution”198 but also mandates that prosecutors provide victims 
with “the reason for declining to proceed with the case.”199  Finally, New 
Jersey, while not commenting on conferral before or in the absence of 
charges, permits victims to submit a written statement to the prosecution, 
which must be considered before they make a final decision on whether to 
file charges.200 
B.  What Does Conferral Include? 
One may understandably think the Arizona conferral statutes, in explicitly 
referencing the victim’s “views” and the prosecutor’s “reasons” for declining 
charges, present concrete examples of what the law contemplates conferral 
to include.201  However, in both statutory provisions and case law, the 
prevailing method to explain the substance of conferral is to look to its 
limitations.  That is, the right to confer is often defined by what it is not meant 
to encompass.202 
Part II.B.1 focuses on the substance and boundaries of conferral in the 
CVRA, looking to its legislative history, case law, and certain DOJ 
interpretations.  Part II.B.2 briefly recounts pending legislation and its 
purported view on the substance of CVRA conferral.  Last, Part II.B.3 
examines the subject matter and limitations of conferral in the states. 
1.  The CVRA 
Though Senator Jon Kyl, a cosponsor of the CVRA, repeatedly 
emphasized the CVRA’s expansive nature in the legislative record,203 he was 
equally prepared to note where its reach did not extend.204  He declared that 
the right to confer did not grant the victim any authority to direct the 
prosecution.205  Of course, as discussed previously, the statute itself provides 
that none of its provisions can be construed to impair prosecutorial 
discretion.206  That provision, as well as Senator Kyl’s commentary, 
 
 196. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-38-114(a) (2020). 
 197. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258B, § 3(g) (2020).  The statute separately references the 
filing of a nolle prosequi, or dismissal of charges, suggesting that this language may be 
broader. See id. 
 198. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4419(A) (2020). 
 199. Id. § 13-4408(B). 
 200. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4B-36(m) (West 2020). 
 201. See supra Part II.A.3. 
 202. See infra Parts II.B.1, II.B.3. 
 203. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 204. See 150 CONG. REC. 7302 (2004) (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl). 
 205. See id. 
 206. See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(6). 
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comports with the extensive case law predating the CVRA that keeps 
prosecutorial discretion fully intact.207  But courts have had some 
opportunities to interpret the extent to which prosecutorial discretion may be 
curtailed. 
In Jordan v. Department of Justice,208 the court addressed the substance 
of the right to confer.  The plaintiff, Gigi Jordan, had lodged a complaint with 
the authorities against her ex-husband claiming she was a victim of his 
financial fraud schemes.209  She sent documents detailing fraudulent activity 
to a prosecutor and subsequently met with the prosecutor for an hour to 
discuss her allegations.210 
Although no charges were filed against her ex-husband, Jordan filed suit 
seeking enforcement of her CVRA rights, including her right to confer.211  
The court did not address whether the conferral right applied at such an early 
stage212 but nonetheless found that, even if it did, prosecutors had complied 
with their conferral responsibilities.213  In short, the court held that receiving 
and reviewing documents and meeting with the plaintiff for an hour 
constituted sufficient conferral as applied to the facts.214  The court also noted 
that, while individuals who feel victimized should attempt to convince 
authorities to pursue prosecution, “they cannot dictate the manner, timing, or 
quantity of conferrals.”215 
In a Fifth Circuit case, DOJ had been contemplating criminal charges 
following an explosion at a refinery that killed fifteen people and injured 170 
others.216  Before reaching a plea agreement, the government filed an ex parte 
motion requesting that the district court formulate procedures under the 
CVRA’s exception for numerous crime victims,217 since notification would 
not be “practicable” and would lead to media coverage that could “impair” 
the negotiation process and prejudice the case.218 
The district court promptly issued the ex parte order, which prohibited the 
government from notifying the victims prior to signing the plea agreement 
and directed the government to complete its CVRA obligations afterward but 
in advance of the agreement being entered in court.219  The Fifth Circuit 
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 210. Id. at 47. 
 211. Id. at 48–49. 
 212. See Reply Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Respondents’ Motion to 
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 214. See id. 
 215. Id. at 53. 
 216. In re Dean, 527 F.3d 391, 392 (5th Cir. 2008). 
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found a CVRA violation and held that (1) neither notification to nor conferral 
with less than 200 individuals was impracticable and (2) the prospect of 
impairing the negotiations through undue influence did not warrant the 
abdication of conferral obligations.220  The court indicated that the “policy 
decision” underlying the right of conferral meant that victims have a right to 
inform the plea negotiation process, regardless of whether they seek to hinder 
a particular plea offer or facilitate the reaching of another.221 
These holdings help illustrate the boundaries of conferral obligations as 
they relate to prosecutors seeking to exercise their discretion.  Other inquiries 
into conferral have indirectly focused on such discretion not by evaluating 
the conduct of prosecutors but by considering affirmative requests for 
information by victims themselves.222  For example, the plaintiff before the 
Jordan court sought additional meetings with the government in connection 
with her ex-husband’s financial fraud scheme.223  The court found this 
request unavailing and remarked that the CVRA does not create a “self-
effectuating right” irrespective of its effect on “resources, any pending 
investigation, or prosecutorial discretion.”224  The court observed that the 
right to confer, by its own terms, is not absolute but “reasonable.”225  
Similarly, the court in Rubin recognized that the term “reasonable” supplies 
the government with critical flexibility and held that the information-
gathering feature of the conferral right is logically constrained by its 
“relevance to a victim’s right to participate” in the criminal justice process; 
in short, it does not sanction “an unbridled gallop” to the information in the 
government’s records.226 
As for the government’s own views, DOJ has interpreted the boundaries 
of the right as explained in Part II.A.1.c above.  To reiterate, the AG 
Guidelines reference the substance of conferral primarily in the context of 
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plea negotiations.227  To the extent that the OLC opinion directly addresses 
the relationship between discretion and conferral, it states that prosecutors 
are free to confer as they wish but are not obligated to do so prior to bringing 
charges.228  Where any negotiations relate to the charging decision, however, 
the OLC considers them to be outside the ambit of conferral.229 
2.  The Proposed Amendment to the CVRA 
The pending legislation to amend the CVRA does not comment on the 
substance (or limitations) of conferral beyond including language that the 
right to confer must extend to plea bargains or other resolutions before they 
are finalized.230  Separately, however, the legislation does contemplate 
imposing safeguards on any notification made to victims about NPAs or 
referral to other agencies.231  For example, the bill stipulates that victims may 
be required to maintain confidentiality as to any disclosed nonpublic 
information learned if the government can show good cause grounded in 
concern for public safety or the needs of an ongoing investigation.232  The 
duty of confidentiality, in turn, is not to be greater than the one imposed on 
the government or the defendant.233  Finally, as an enforcement mechanism, 
the bill permits the attorney general to assess civil penalties, subject to notice 
and opportunity for a hearing, for any breaches of confidentiality by 
victims.234 
3.  State Law Survey 
This section discusses three ways in which state laws indicate the 
substance of and limitations to conferral by: (1) acknowledging the 
importance of preserving prosecutorial discretion, (2) restricting the subject 
matter of conferral by narrowly defining “crime” or “victim” in victim’s 
rights laws to include only specific crimes, and (3) mandating consideration 
of the victim’s views. 
Just as the CVRA explicitly recognizes the established nature of 
prosecutorial discretion,235 so to do the various state constitutions and 
statutes that grant the right to confer, often by denying victims remedies when 
prosecutors violate their rights.236  Even the scant case law available on 
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conferral237 confirms this approach and has upheld the principle that the right 
to confer cannot intrude on prosecutorial discretion.  For example, the 
Tennessee Supreme Court has held that the right to confer does not include 
the power to direct a prosecution in any manner.238  In other instances, where 
courts did not specifically address conferral rights but rather victim’s rights 
broadly, they have likewise held that such rights do not empower victims to 
challenge the charging discretion of prosecutors.239  Much like the federal 
courts described above, a Texas court preserved this discretion when 
addressing whether victims are entitled to discovery in a pending criminal 
matter as part of their conferral right.  It held that the state legislature sought 
to rectify victim alienation by giving victims access to the prosecutor, not to 
the prosecutor’s files.240 
Many states also limit the application of their victim’s rights laws, 
including conferral rights, by statutorily restricting the crimes that confer 
victims rights.241  For instance, North Carolina defines a crime victim as any 
person against whom there is probable cause to believe that one of a number 
of enumerated crimes was committed, including all felonies and serious 
misdemeanors.242  It also permits the district attorney to decide whether the 
commission of a particular crime, if not otherwise listed, may still grant 
victims status as a victim under the law.243  Colorado individually lists every 
offense, act, or violation that, if committed, would grant victim status.244  
And New York catalogues all offenses for which the right to confer, in 
particular, is triggered and includes only certain felonies.245 
Finally, some state statutes go beyond using the broad terms “confer” and 
“consult” and provide some guidance as to what conferral may include.  As 
discussed in Part II.A.3, Arizona requires that its prosecutors confer with 
victims about their “views” regarding, inter alia, a decision not to proceed 
with a prosecution.246  A complementary Arizona statute requires that this 
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conferral include the “reasons” for the declination decision.247  Tennessee 
likewise mandates that its prosecutors confer with victims about their views 
regarding a decision not to proceed with a prosecution.248  Most other state 
conferral statutes also include language referring to consideration of the 
victim’s “views” or “opinions” but reject its application to preindictment 
dispositions.249 
As Part II illustrates, the right to confer, both under the CVRA and in the 
states, can serve an important purpose in achieving victim participation in the 
early stages of the criminal justice process.  But what the law has not done is 
extend this right to nonprosecution postures.250  To be sure, there are myriad 
valid reasons for not doing so.251  Yet the general absence of an enforceable 
victim’s right to confer about declination decisions does not mean that 
conferral need not accompany exercises of nonprosecution discretion.  The 
next part proposes when and how such a conferral “right” should be 
established. 
III.  REASONABLE CONFERRAL IN A NONPROSECUTION POSTURE 
The Epstein litigation understandably drew the ire of many.  How was it 
possible, in a case where the government identified thirty-four victims of 
alleged sex trafficking and drafted a fifty-three-page indictment, that 
prosecutors would instead secretly bind themselves to an NPA?  To the 
Eleventh Circuit (and the lower court), there is no acceptable answer.252  
NPAs are especially controversial exercises of nonprosecution discretion253 
and present unique challenges to a victim’s ability to participate in the 
criminal justice process.254  But exercises of nonprosecution discretion not 
memorialized in NPAs and DPAs can likewise be controversial and exclude 
 
 247. Id. § 13-4408(B). 
 248. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-38-114(a) (2020). 
 249. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-23-64 (2020); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-17-11 (2020); N.Y. 
EXEC. LAW § 642(1); VA. CODE § 19.2-11.01(A)(4)(d) (2020); W. VA. CODE § 61-11A-6(a)(5) 
(2020); see also Brown, supra note 32, at 880. 
 250. See infra Part III.A.1. 
 251. See infra Parts III.A.1, III.B. 
 252. See In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196, passim (11th Cir.), vacated, reh’g en banc granted, 
No. 19-13843, 2020 WL 4557083 (11th Cir. Aug. 7, 2020) (mem.); Doe III, 359 F. Supp. 3d 
1201, 1219–20 (S.D. Fla. 2019). 
 253. See Zendeh, supra note 32 at 1457, 1457 & n.42.  See generally Brandon L. Garrett, 
The Metamorphosis of Corporate Criminal Prosecutions, 101 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 60 (2016); 
David M. Uhlmann, Deferred Prosecution and Non-prosecution Agreements and the Erosion 
of Corporate Criminal Liability, 72 MD. L. REV. 1295 (2013).  DOJ primarily uses NPAs, 
along with DPAs, in the corporate context.  Their use has skyrocketed:  between 1992 and 
2000, DOJ negotiated thirteen such agreements, but over 500 DPAs and NPAs have been 
negotiated since. See Uhlmann, supra, at 1316; 2019 Year-End Update on Corporate Deferred 
Prosecution Agreements and Non-prosecution Agreements, GIBSON DUNN (Jan. 8, 2020), 
https://www.gibsondunn.com/2019-year-end-npa-dpa-update/ [https://perma.cc/GGD9-
WTB2].  Judge Emmett Sullivan, district judge for the District of Columbia, and Professor 
Brandon Garrett, however, believe the use of DPAs and NPAs in the corporate context is 
undesirable and that they should be used more broadly for individual offenders instead. See 
Garrett, supra, at 70 & n.42. 
 254. See infra Part III.A.1. 
2020] SECRET FAITS ACCOMPLIS 373 
victims.255  Still, instituting victim involvement prior to a declination 
decision may have adverse consequences of its own.256  Thus, striking a 
balance between meaningful conferral on the one end and discretionary 
decision-making on the other is critical. 
Part III recommends a resolution:  prosecutors’ offices should promulgate 
guidelines, grounded in procedural justice, that encourage conferral with 
victims in certain cases where a prosecutor decides not to file charges.  And 
when a prosecutor intends to sign an NPA, this Note advocates that they must 
confer with victims before doing so, absent a showing of good cause.  In turn, 
Part III.A introduces the proposed guidelines, and Part III.B considers their 
implications. 
A.  A Proposal to Confer 
Prosecutorial guidelines offer a viable means of incentivizing prosecutors 
to confer with crime victims given the general reluctance of courts to 
constrain257 and the intent of victim’s rights laws to preserve prosecutorial 
discretion.258  Part III.A.1 argues the need for conferral in some 
nonprosecution postures, especially in the context of NPAs.  Part III.A.2 
presents model guidelines that prosecutors’ offices should adopt to effectuate 
a conferral “right.” 
1.  The Need for Conferral 
As Part I.B.1 illustrated, to the extent that victims may be less willing to 
cooperate with criminal justice authorities because they perceive the process 
and its actors as unfair or insufficiently attentive to their needs, society’s 
goals of effective crime control may suffer.259  Prosecutors have a direct 
impact on victims by virtue of their ability to move a case forward.  But too 
often, when a prosecutor elects not to bring charges, the victim’s role may be 
nonexistent.260  Indeed, as one scholar has noted, the victim practically 
vanishes following an arrest.261 
As a consequence, the conferral right is valuable for victims as a vehicle 
to both obtain information from prosecutors about important case 
developments and to provide information of their own—facts or opinions that 
keep the prosecution apprised of the victim’s perspectives.262  Legal 
authorities recognize that conferral has clear, articulable benefits in certain 
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precharge contexts, such as plea negotiations.263  Given that almost all 
federal and state convictions are now obtained by plea bargains, this 
recognition is not surprising.264 
But pleas are entered into publicly before a court.265  NPAs, on the other 
hand, are maintained by private parties.266  Put simply, entering into an NPA 
without notice or conferral may be more damaging than entering into a plea 
agreement without the same because once the former is signed, the matter is 
closed and there is no later opportunity for victims to provide input.267  
However, outside of possibly the Fifth Circuit268 and the Eastern District of 
Virginia,269 prosecutors can freely choose to ignore victims before declining 
to charge or signing an NPA.270  And states, apart from a select few, 
categorically do not grant victims a right to confer in such instances.271  In 
the next section and in the spirit of the OLC’s “good practice” language, as 
discussed above, this Note proposes that prosecutors’ offices take it upon 
themselves to fill this gap and confer in certain nonprosecution postures.272 
2.  A Conferral “Right” Enshrined in Prosecutorial Guidelines 
As a threshold matter, federal prosecutors across the country are already 
subject to certain statutory duties with respect to the fair treatment of 
victims.273  The AG Guidelines set out uniform standards for prosecutors 
regarding victim treatment and assistance,274 and many state statutes obligate 
prosecutors to confer with victims.275 
The current AG Guidelines state that prosecutors “should make reasonable 
efforts to notify identified victims of, and consider victims’ views about, 
prospective plea negotiations.”276  They go on to specify that, “[i]n 
circumstances where plea negotiations occur before a case has been brought, 
Department policy is these efforts should include reasonable consultation 
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prior to the filing of a charging instrument with the court.”277  Factors bearing 
on the extent of conferral can include the impact on public and personal 
safety, the number of victims, whether time is of the essence, and whether 
there is a need for confidentiality.278 
Given this useful language, this Note proposes the promulgation of victim 
conferral guidelines that retain some of the discretionary elements of the 
existing obligations in plea negotiations.  The proposed guidelines would 
read: 
Prospective Declination Decisions: 
(a) Conferral consists of the reasonable solicitation and consideration of 
the victim’s views on any information the prosecutor shares. 
(b) In serious offense279 cases, a prosecutor should make reasonable 
efforts to confer with victims and provide victims with an explanation of a 
forthcoming nonprosecution decision. 
(c) In serious offense cases where the prosecutor enters a nonprosecution 
agreement, the prosecutor shall, absent a showing of good cause, confer 
with victims in a reasonable, timely manner prior to the signing of the 
agreement. 
The considerations that may favor or disfavor substantive conferral in both 
provisions are similar to those already catalogued in the AG Guidelines with 
one additional factor:  whether relaying any information has the risk of 
prejudicing uncharged individuals.280  Provision (c), which borrows 
language from the pending legislation to amend the CVRA, treats NPAs 
differently in that it requires prior conferral absent a showing of good 
cause.281  Because only conferral regarding NPAs is required and the burden 
is placed on the government to affirmatively prove relief from the 
requirement, the guidelines do not envision a distinct remedy for victims. 
This Note also endorses adoption of these guidelines in the state context.  
While states like Arizona282 and, to a lesser extent, Massachusetts,283 
Tennessee,284 and New Jersey,285 require prosecutors to consider victim 
input before a declination decision, most states do not.286  As a result, these 
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guidelines may encourage conferral in the absence of any statutory 
obligations. 
Lastly, understanding how the need for prosecutorial discretion interacts 
with the need for meaningful conferral is critical to the sensible 
implementation of the proposed guidelines.  This Note advocates adopting 
the four-factor procedural justice framework once a prosecutor elects to 
confer with a victim.287  The chief factor relevant here is voice—whenever 
feasible, prosecutors should allow victims to share their narratives and their 
views about a declination.288  Emphasizing procedural justice during 
conferral helps ensure fair treatment of victims and will promote their 
satisfaction with the decision-making process, even if they find the final 
outcome unfavorable.289 
B.  Limitations on Conferral and Countervailing Concerns 
Part III.B.1 examines when conferral should be initiated and Part III.B.2 
excavates its substance.  In doing so, both sections address several 
countervailing concerns that may weigh in favor of curtailing conferral. 
1.  When to Begin Conferral 
This Note recommends that deciding when conferral should begin is best 
left to the discretion of the prosecutor.  As the Rubin court observed, it makes 
little sense for victims to confer soon after the time of their victimization.290  
Nor is it always practical or helpful for them to do so if the government has 
yet to contemplate any charges.291  To adopt such a presumption in favor of 
conferral would unnecessarily burden the government, its resources, and the 
pendency of various investigations.292  Ultimately, a victim-centered system 
need not be a victim-ruled one.293 
Professor Paul Cassell has argued that CVRA rights, including conferral 
rights, should attach when an agency employee “engaged in the detection, 
investigation, or prosecution of crime has substantial evidence that an 
identifiable person has been directly and proximately harmed as a result of 
the commission of a federal offense” and, in the employee’s judgment, “that 
person is a putative victim of that offense.”294  This framework, however, 
does not adequately address the valid concerns of the In re Wild and Rubin 
courts.295 Agency personnel routinely identify victims very early on in the 
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criminal justice process—indeed, many notification rights turn on such 
identifications.296 
But, as Professor Robert Mosteller explained in his congressional 
testimony on the potential hazards of enacting a victim’s rights constitutional 
amendment, this identification may derive from mistakes or, worse, 
dishonesty.297  Professor Mosteller recounted notable police brutality cases 
in which the victims were almost charged as perpetrators, as well as the many 
DNA exonerations in which victim evidence was the only evidence of the 
defendant’s guilt.298  He makes clear that while the legal system is designed 
to preliminarily identify a defendant at the outset, it is not often obvious who 
the victim is or even whether the victim was harmed by the defendant or by 
someone yet to be apprehended.299  As Professor Lynne Henderson adds, 
victims can also be offenders—in the classic case of a domestic violence 
victim who fights back and is thereafter charged, the questions of when and 
to whom victim status should attach are difficult to resolve.300  Thus, 
attaching conferral rights as early as Professor Cassell suggests and subject 
only to the independent judgment of individual agency employees poses risks 
that are independent of the strain on resources and prosecutorial discretion.301 
Thus, the proposed guidelines offer prosecutors necessary leeway in 
deciding when to begin conferral, which comports with federal and state 
laws’ recognition of prosecutorial discretion.302  But the guidelines would 
impose duties at stages when conferral ought to be an important 
consideration—in the lead-up to a declination decision.  Put another way, the 
inquiries of when and whether to confer at all converge at this juncture.  Both 
the In re Wild and Rubin courts recognized the utility of conferral prior to a 
declination decision.303  Operating under procedural justice principles, the 
guidelines presume that there is a net positive benefit to effectuating conferral 
before exercising nonprosecution discretion, in the absence of any 
countervailing reasons. 
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 297. See Hearing on H.J. Res. 40, supra note 55, at 35–36 (statement of Robert P. 
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 298. See id. 
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 300. See Henderson, supra note 30, at 404. 
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(mem.); United States v. Rubin, 558 F. Supp. 2d 411, 419 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). 
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2.  What to Confer About 
The proposed guidelines envision conferral to be straightforward—the 
prosecutor provides victims the reasons for a nonprosecution decision and 
the victim provides their opinions or views on the decision.  DOJ already 
keeps internal records of the reasons for certain declination decisions.  When 
a prosecutor declines charges in cases referred by any agency, DOJ’s Justice 
Manual requires that the prosecutor’s files reflect that decision and the 
“reason for it.”304  All NPAs signed in return for a person’s cooperation are 
recorded, primarily because the terms of the agreement may become 
important in future litigation and because the agreement serves to identify 
individuals the government has agreed not to prosecute.305 
Providing victims with the reasons for declination, subject to limitations, 
furthers the procedural justice agenda—transparency may lead victims to 
believe that prosecutors are neutral and trustworthy actors.306  It may 
likewise demonstrate to victims that they too are respected actors in the 
criminal justice system.307  Providing reasons is also a hallmark principle of 
administrative law.308  To the extent that unilateral prosecutorial decisions 
are properly described as administrative decisions,309 disclosures align 
incentives to achieve consistency—treating similar cases in a similar 
fashion.310  Unequal treatment in charging decisions is a long-standing 
criticism of prosecutorial discretion.311  Insofar as a victim’s rights measure 
can ameliorate this inconsistency, or at least reduce the opaque nature of 
charging decisions, the larger public and not just the victim has much to 
gain.312 
But the subject or extent of conferral can implicate many legitimate 
concerns.  As a threshold matter, navigating the prosecutor-victim 
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relationship is a delicate process.313  A prosecutor can and should attempt to 
communicate with victims prior to the conferral to set reasonable 
expectations for the development of the case314 and dispel any expectation 
that the prosecutor is the victim’s client or acting in the victim’s interest.315  
And while procedural justice goals emphasize a victim’s “voice,” they also 
value honesty and trustworthiness, which means a prosecutor should also 
convey that what victims find emotionally or experientially relevant may not 
hold legal importance for the case.316 
Moreover, there are a number of concerns that may warrant limiting 
conferral in a given matter:  administrative burdens on efficiency and 
transaction costs, a legitimate need for confidentiality, ethical concerns about 
prejudicing uncharged individuals, or an undue victim influence on the 
charging decision with ramifications for potential defendants. 
Administrative burdens can arise in many forms.  To start, conferral 
redirects already scarce criminal justice resources.317  Some cases may 
require more conferral than others.  Some victims may be hard to track down.  
Others may be unresponsive.  And in the “assembly line” of case processing 
at a district attorney’s office, which can resolve high volumes of routine, low-
level cases with breakneck speed, conferral may incur simply prohibitive 
costs.318  The ensuing delays may also prejudice defendants,319 who may 
have elected, at great risk, to cooperate with the government in exchange for 
nonprosecution. 
The proposed guidelines account for some of these concerns.  The 
narrowing of eligible crimes keeps only the more serious offenses in play.320  
Preserving prosecutorial discretion through language such as “reasonable 
efforts” provides prosecutors with the “vital flexibility” they need when 
confronting logistical difficulties.321  As the Jordan court noted with respect 
to CVRA conferral, the “manner, timing, or quantity of conferrals” is 
appropriately within the ken of prosecutors, not victims.322 
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Next, a legitimate need for maintaining confidentiality may justify 
restricting the substance of conferral.  Courts have noted this concern and 
held that conferral, at least as constituted in statute, is relevant only insofar 
as it accords victims a participatory right and access to prosecutors.  It does 
not sanction limitless information gathering.323  The AG Guidelines provide 
for confidentiality as a consideration during conferral, and the proposed 
guidelines would not materially change this calculus.324 
The Oklahoma City bombing prosecution provides one illustration of how 
the need for confidentiality may outweigh the interest in complete disclosure.  
Michael and Lori Fortier, though not participants in the bombing conspiracy, 
knew about the plan.325  In seeking to solidify their case against the bomber, 
Timothy McVeigh, prosecutors permitted Michael Fortier to plead to lesser 
charges in exchange for his testimony against McVeigh and granted Lori 
Fortier immunity from prosecution for the same.326  Prosecutors knew that 
the Fortiers’ testimony was vital to the case but, because the Fortiers testified 
in the grand jury, which implicated secrecy rules, prosecutors could not share 
with the victims why they chose to strike a deal with the Fortiers.327  One of 
the prosecutors later remarked that although victims may have wanted more 
serious charges pressed or a detailed explanation for the cooperation 
agreement, doing so could have diverted significant prosecutorial resources 
and led to the loss of critical evidence.328 
The prospect of publicly disclosing statements that have a likelihood of 
prejudicing uncharged individuals may also limit the substance of conferral.  
DOJ ordinarily constrains these comments,329 as do ethics rules.330  But they 
do not outright prohibit them.331  In fact, the American Bar Association’s 
Standards for Criminal Justice, which DOJ encourages its lawyers to learn332 
and which otherwise catalog concerns of prejudice to uncharged 
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individuals,333 still urge prosecutors to consult with victims prior to 
exercising nonprosecution discretion.334  The proposed guidelines 
contemplate, subject to the confidentiality considerations above, that 
prosecutors may properly give reasons for declination without implying guilt 
or prejudicing the interests of uncharged individuals.335 
Finally, there may be a concern that conferral prior to declination allows 
the victim to unduly influence the declination decision with undesirable 
consequences for the potential defendant, including the filing of charges.336  
Potential defendants may wonder whether they are up against not one but two 
adversaries.  Ordinarily, defendant-oriented criticisms of victim involvement 
in the criminal process deal with what occurs after there is a “defendant,” in 
other words, when an individual is formally accused.337 
But to the extent that the argument is that the proposed guidelines will 
independently create issues for potential defendants, this concern is largely 
unavailing.  First, while prosecutors enjoy virtually unreviewable discretion 
in their charging decisions, they are still subject to constraints if they do 
ultimately bring charges.  The defendant may challenge the sufficiency of the 
evidence, bring constitutional claims of retaliation or discrimination, or even 
contest the motivation of the prosecution if it was impermissibly directed by 
the victim.338  Second, victims have an independent and legitimate interest 
in fairness and due process; they are citizens and may even some day be 
defendants.339  Professor Henderson contends that some communities, such 
as racial minorities, may value procedural safeguards over a “winning at all 
costs” mentality.340  Third, the stereotype of victims as vengeful is overstated 
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and, in reality, many victims can and do urge leniency.341  And fourth, as 
scholars have observed, the prevailing criticism of prosecutors with respect 
to victim involvement is that they are insufficiently attentive to victims’ 
needs, certainly not that they are victims’ surrogates.342  If prosecutors are 
attentive, evidence suggests that they are more likely to persuade the victim 
to adopt the prosecutor’s own interpretation of the case rather than the other 
way around.343  As Professor Bennett Gershman, a former prosecutor, has 
noted, most prosecutors undoubtedly believe that they have the ultimate 
authority to make decisions, regardless of the victims’ views.344  Where the 
guidelines are most likely to apply and alter a prosecutor’s conduct is where 
a prosecutor may hesitate or be otherwise reluctant to speak to victims even, 
and especially, in the absence of a justifiable reason. 
CONCLUSION 
Today, victim participation is a mainstay of the criminal process.  No 
longer limited to occupying a complainant or witness role, victims are now 
present or heard at various junctures following the commencement of a 
criminal proceeding.  What remains unclear is what role, if any, victims 
should play if there is no criminal prosecution.  In particular, to what extent 
should prosecutors inform and confer with victims before they ultimately 
choose to exercise their nonprosecution discretion?  And, at what cost? 
For victims who wish to be involved in the criminal process and for whom 
the earliest stages are often alienating, a declination decision has the potential 
to minimize or eliminate their participation entirely.  Procedural justice 
theory predicts that such exclusion can result in adverse consequences not 
just for victims and their respect for legal authorities but also for the public’s 
perception of criminal justice decision-making writ large.  Because the law 
largely imposes no conferral obligations on a prosecutor prior to a charging 
decision, there exist no reliable procedural principles to ensure or even 
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encourage conferral before a prosecutor exercises his or her nonprosecution 
discretion. 
To fill this void, this Note proposes the adoption of prosecutorial 
guidelines, grounded in elements of procedural justice theory, that urge or, 
with respect to NPAs, require prosecutors to confer with victims prior to 
declination.  And, in recognition of various countervailing interests, the 
guidelines build in necessary flexibility.  If criminal justice actors are truly 
sincere in their belief that victims should be a part of the process, then they 
should do their best to explain to victims why they see fit not to start the 
process at all. 
